Course information:

Copy and paste current course information from Class Search/Course Catalog.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Unit</th>
<th>SILC</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>German Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-Kulti: Multiculturalism through Film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is this a cross-listed course?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>If yes, please identify course(s)</td>
<td>SLC 455</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Is this a shared course?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Course description:</td>
<td>This course will deal with the culture and politics of minorities in contemporary Central Europe. We will discuss how ethnic identities are perceived, constructed, and marketed as well as how they perceive themselves and the &quot;others.&quot; We also engage critically with such concepts as migration, assimilation, citizenship, hybridity, and authenticity. We will focus on exemplary films, including comparisons with minority experiences in other countries. Through film and other material on the topic, students will learn to contextualize recruitment of guest workers, xenophobia and racism, citizenship law, immigration and national identity, the institutions of multiculturalism, religion, the private sphere, multilingualism, popular culture, and globalization.</td>
<td>If so, list all academic units offering this course</td>
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</table>

Requested designation: Global Awareness-G

Note- a separate proposal is required for each designation requested

Eligibility:

Permanent numbered courses must have completed the university's review and approval process.
For the rules governing approval of omnibus courses, contact Phyllis.Lucie@asu.edu or Lauren.Leo@asu.edu.

Submission deadlines dates are as follow:
For Fall 2015 Effective Date: October 9, 2014
For Spring 2016 Effective Date: March 19, 2015

Area(s) proposed course will serve:
A single course may be proposed for more than one core or awareness area. A course may satisfy a core area requirement and more than one awareness area requirements concurrently, but may not satisfy requirements in two core areas simultaneously, even if approved for those areas. With departmental consent, an approved General Studies course may be counted toward both the General Studies requirement and the major program of study.

Checklists for general studies designations:
Complete and attach the appropriate checklist
- Literacy and Critical Inquiry core courses (L)
- Mathematics core courses (M)
- Computer/statistics/quantitative applications core courses (CS)
- Humanities, Arts and Design core courses (H)
- Social-Behavioral Sciences core courses (SB)
- Natural Sciences core courses (NS/SG)
- Cultural Diversity in the United States courses (C)
- Global Awareness courses (G)
- Historical Awareness courses (H)

A complete proposal should include:
- Signed General Studies Program Course Proposal Cover Form
- Criteria Checklist for the area
- Course Catalog description
- Course Syllabus
- Copy of Table of Contents from the textbook and list of required readings/books

Respectfully request that proposals are submitted electronically with all files compiled into one PDF. If necessary, a hard copy of the proposal will be accepted.

Contact information:
Name: Carla Ghanem
Phone: 5-7871

Rev. 1/94, 4/95, 7/98, 4/00, 1/02, 10/08, 11/11/12/11, 7/12, 5/14
Department Chair/Director approval: (Required)

Chair/Director name (Typed): Joe Cutter
Chair/Director (Signature):

Date: 11/4/14
Rationale and Objectives

Human organizations and relationships have evolved from being family and village centered to modern global interdependence. The greatest challenge in the nuclear age is developing and maintaining a global perspective which fosters international cooperation. While the modern world is comprised of politically independent states, people must transcend nationalism and recognize the significant interdependence among peoples of the world. The exposure of students to different cultural systems provides the background of thought necessary to developing a global perspective.

Cultural learning is present in many disciplines. Exposure to perspectives on art, business, engineering, music, and the natural and social sciences that lead to an understanding of the contemporary world supports the view that intercultural interaction has become a daily necessity. The complexity of American society forces people to balance regional and national goals with global concerns. Many of the most serious problems are world issues and require solutions which exhibit mutuality and reciprocity. No longer are hunger, ecology, health care delivery, language planning, information exchanges, economic and social developments, law, technology transfer, philosophy, and the arts solely national concerns; they affect all the people of the world. Survival may be dependent on the ability to generate global solutions to some of the most pressing problems.

The word university, from universitas, implies that knowledge comes from many sources and is not restricted to local, regional, or national perspectives. The Global Awareness Area recognizes the need for an understanding of the values, elements, and social processes of cultures other than the culture of the United States. Learning which recognizes the nature of others cultures and the relationship of America’s cultural system to generic human goals and welfare will help create the multicultural and global perspective necessary for effective interaction in the human community.

Courses which meet the requirement in global awareness are of one or more of the following types: (1) in-depth area studies which are concerned with an examination of culture-specific elements of a region of the world, country, or culture group, (2) the study of contemporary non-English language courses that have a significant cultural component, (3) comparative cultural studies with an emphasis on non-U.S. areas, and (4) in-depth studies of non-U.S. centered cultural interrelationships of global scope such as the global interdependence produced by problems of world ecology, multinational corporations, migration, and the threat of nuclear war.
Proposer: Please complete the following section and attach appropriate documentation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Identify Documentation Submitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1. Studies must</strong> be composed of subject matter that addresses or leads to an understanding of the contemporary world outside the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2. The course must match at least one of the following descriptions: (check all which may apply):</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>a. In-depth area studies concerned with an examination of culture-specific elements of a region, country or culture group. The area or culture studied must be non-U.S. and the study must contribute to an understanding of the contemporary world.</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>b. The course is a language course for a contemporary non-English language, and has a significant cultural component.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>c. The course is a comparative cultural study in which most, i.e., more than half, of the material is devoted to non-U.S. areas.</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>d. The course is a study of the cultural significance of a non-U.S.-centered global issue. The course examines the role of its target issue within each culture and the interrelatedness of various global cultures on that issue. It looks at the cultural significance of its issue in various cultures outside the U.S., both examining the issue’s place within each culture and the effects of that issue on world cultures.”</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explain in detail which student activities correspond to the specific designation criteria. Please use the following organizer to explain how the criteria are being met.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria (from checksheet)</th>
<th>How course meets spirit (contextualize specific examples in next column)</th>
<th>Please provide detailed evidence of how course meets criteria (i.e., where in syllabus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d: study the cultural significance of a non-U.S. centered global issue</td>
<td><strong>SAMPLE:</strong> The course examines the cultural significance of financial markets Japan, Korea, and the UK.</td>
<td><strong>SAMPLE:</strong> Module 2 shows how Japanese literature has shaped how Japanese people understand world markets. Module 3 shows how Japanese popular culture has been changed by the world financial market system. Modules 4 &amp; 5 do the same for Korea and modules 6 &amp; 7 do the same for the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Studies must be composed of subject matter that addresses or leads to an understanding of the contemporary world outside the U.S.</td>
<td>This course is designed to teach about cultures and multiculturalism across the world with an emphasis in Europe. This course introduces the students to different terminology items surrounding culture/society and the contemporary world. Through Films and readings on cultures/multiculturalism from all over the world these themes will be displayed, interpreted and discussed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.a. In-depth area studies concerned with examination of a culture-specific elements of a region, country, or culture group</td>
<td>This course is designed to teach contemporary culture, specifically multiculturalism and themes that arise when discussing multiculturalism. The readings/films as well as the assignments are designed in a way to examine non-U.S. cultures and multiculturalism around the world and how and whether multiculturalism, immigration, etc. work in these societies/countries.</td>
<td>Week 3-19 show how culture-specific elements, such as immigration, citizenship, belonging, assimilation, adaptation, etc., are examined and discussed and how these cultures compare to each other and how they have been changed by the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.d. study the cultural significance of a non-U.S. centered global issue</td>
<td>This course examines the cultures and multiculturality of European countries. It specifically looks at issues/themes that accompany multiculturalism, such as immigration, citizenship, identity, social distance, belonging, etc.</td>
<td>Week 1 and 2 show how the students are prepared to discuss the issues and themes of multiculturalism. The remaining time different cultures will be examined by looking at different cultural and global issues and their significance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Welcome to GER/SLC 455:
Multi-Kulti: Multiculturalism through Film

Professor
Carla Ghanem, Ph.D.

Class schedule
W 4:30 - 7:15 PM, LL 263

Office
LL 427

E-mail
carla.ghanem@asu.edu

Office Hours
Tuesdays 1-2 PM, Wednesdays 2-3 PM, & by appointment

Office Phone
(480) 965-7871

Departmental office phone
(480) 965-6282

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course will deal with the culture and politics of minorities in contemporary Central Europe. We will discuss how ethnic identities are perceived, constructed, and marketed as well as how they perceive themselves and the "others." We also engage critically with such concepts as migration, assimilation, citizenship, hybridity, and authenticity. We will focus on exemplary films, including comparisons with minority experiences in other countries. Through film and other material on the topic, students will learn to contextualize recruitment of guest workers, xenophobia and racism, citizenship law, immigration and national identity, the institutions of multiculturalism, religion, the private sphere, multilingualism, popular culture, and globalization.

STUDENT LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon successful completion of this course, students will be able:

1. To apply their knowledge on the topics and themes of multiculturalism, identity, immigration, multilingualism, citizenship in Europe and the world when analyzing films, readings as well as when reflecting on their own cultures.
2. To use theories on multiculturalism in their discussions in class, their presentations, and their written work.
3. To develop basic knowledge of procedures in film and text analysis related to issues discussed in class.
4. To discuss and write about issues surrounding multiculturalism.

DESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE COMPONENTS

Participation and Attendance (10%):

Daily attendance in class is mandatory. If you require accommodations on assignments for a disability, university-sanctioned event, or religious holiday, you must let me know in advance. See the links below for the accommodations the university provides and that this class follows:

- University-sanctioned activities: http://www.asu.edu/aad/manuals/acd/acd304-02.html

Participation is essential for this course. It is important that the students read the assigned readings and come prepared to class.

The deadlines for assignments are to be kept. Failure to turn in assignments on time or not appearing for your presentations will lead to an E for that assignment.

Reflection (20%):
You will have to write a reflection of 7-10 pages on the topic of culture/multiculturalism or any of the readings/films. Please come see me to discuss this.

Presentations (20%):
You will have to prepare two (2) presentations. One presentation on one of the films that we will be discussing in class; one on a film we will NOT discuss in class. Please create a handout for each presentation. In week two, a sign-up sheet for dates on when to present will be presented in class. You can then sign-up for the in-class film as well as the indicated dates for the outside class film. Presentation 1: Film discussion: You will choose one of the films we will be discussing together in class. On the day of the presentation, you will start the discussion on the films, by starting with some of the themes related to immigration, multiculturalism, multilingualism, identity, etc. Have some discussion questions ready. Presentation 2: Choose a film that is related to the topics of the class that we do not discuss in class and present it to the class. Make sure to include a short summary of the film as well as some background information and then discuss one theme that seemed important to you.

Final Project (50%):
The final project is creating a video. This video should be a minimum of 15 minutes and no longer than 20 minutes, and should discuss issues of the class that you see happening in the US and compare it to a country or countries of your choice. You will write a proposal of 1-2 pages; a reflection of your project (ca. 2-3 pages); and a presentation (15 minute presentation, including a handout) on the project. You should discuss the topics and themes for your project with me.

EVALUATION:
Participation: 10 %
Reflection Paper: 20 % - criteria 1
Presentation (2 x 10 %): 20 % - criteria 2 and 3
Final Video/Film project: 50 % - criteria 1, 2, 3, 4

GRADING SYSTEM
A- 90-93 A 94-97 A+ 98-100
B- 80-83 B 84-86 B+ 87-89
C 70-75 C+ 76-79
D 60-69
E 0-59

REQUIRED TEXTS:
Excerpts from books and articles, which can be found electronically on Blackboard.

Tentative FILMS:
La Haine (Hate) - Matthieu Kassowitz (1995, France)
Pane e Cioccolata (Bread and Chocolate) - Franco Brusati (1974, Italy)
**COURSE SCHEDULE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Readings/Assignments due</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Week 1</td>
<td>Introduction and definitions to the topic/issues, etc.</td>
<td>READING: Hum &quot;Multicultural Society and Economic Structure&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>Introduction to the course</td>
<td>READING: Alba &amp; Nee &quot;Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiculturalism/Immigration,</td>
<td>READING: Verkuyten &quot;Social Psychology and Multiculturalism&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 2</td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>READING: Bowen &quot;Europeans against Multiculturalism&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>Multiculturalism/Immigration,</td>
<td>FILM: <em>Vengo (I come)</em> - Tony Gatilf (2000, Spain)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>READING: Daddesio &quot;Representation of the Exotic Other in Vengo by Tony Gatilf&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 3</td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>FILM: <em>Angst Essen Seele auf (Fear Eats the Soul)</em> - Werner Fassbinder (1974, Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>READING: Chin &quot;Introduction: Conceptualizing the &quot;Guest Worker&quot; Question&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>READING: Franklin &quot;Method and Message: Forms of Communication in Fassninder's Angst Essen Seele Auf&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>READING: Burns &amp; Lamb &quot;Social Reality and Stylization in Fear Eats Soul: Fassbinder's Study in Prejudice&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 5</td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>FILM: <em>Pane e Cioccolata (Bread and Chocolate)</em> - Franco Brusati (1974, Italy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 24</td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>READING: &quot;Switzerland's sudden fear of immigrants&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The &quot;other&quot;</td>
<td>READING: &quot;Switzerland's anti-immigrant hysteria&quot;</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Week 6 | Oct. 1 | The Journey | ***Film***: *In the World* - Michael Winterbottom (2002, United Kingdom)  
READING: Farrier "The journey is the film is the journey: Michael Winterbottom's In the World"  
**Final Project Proposal due** |
| Week 7 | Oct. 8 | The Journey | ***Film***: *Latcho Drom (Safe Journey)* - Tony Gatilf (1993, France)  
READING: Malvinni "Gypsy music as film music: Spectacle and act" |
| Week 8 | Oct. 15 | The Refugees | ***Film***: *Fremde Haut (Unveiled)* - Angelina Maccarone (2005, Germany)  
READING: Jeremiah "Touching Distance: Gender, Gemranness and the Gaze in Angelina Maccarone's Fremde Haut (2005)"  
READING: Braun "Multiculturalism as a Social Reality and as a Political Issue: The Case of Germany" |
| Week 9 | Oct. 22 | The Refugees | ***Film***: *Illégal (Illegal)* - Olivier Masset-Depasse (2010, Belgium, Luxembourg, France)  
READING: Rosello "Masset-Depasse's Illégal: How to Narrate Silence and Horror"  
**Reflection Paper due** |
| Week 10 | Oct. 29 | The Refugees | ***Film***: *Terraferma* - Emanuele Crialese (2011, Italy)  
READING: "Past "Island hopping, liquid materiality, and the Mediterranean cinema of Emanuele Crialese" |
| Week 11 | Nov. 5 | Assimilation/Adaption? | ***Film***: *Nordrand* - Barbara Albert (1999, Austria, Germany, Switzerland)  
READING: Michael Jandl, "Road to Citizenship" |
| Week 12 | Nov. 12 | Assimilation/Adaption? | ***Film***: *La Haine (Hate)* - Matthieu Kassowitiz (1995, French)  
READING: Conley "A Web of Hate"  
READING: Loshitzky "The post-Holocaust Jew in the Age of Postcolonialism: La Haine revisited"  
READING: Thömnes "Multiculturalism in France: The Conflict between Islamic Fundamentalism and Traditions of 'laïcisme'" |
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 19</td>
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<td>READING: Mepschen, Duyvendak &amp; Tonkens &quot;Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands&quot;</td>
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<td>READING: Van den Berghe &quot;Multicultural democracy: Can it work?&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Week 14</td>
<td>THANKSGIVING EVE NO CLASSES</td>
<td>Final Project due</td>
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<td>Nov. 26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Week 15</td>
<td>Presentations</td>
<td>Final Project Reflection due</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This is subject to change
POLICIES

ACADEMIC HONESTY: Academic honesty is expected of all students in all examinations, papers, laboratory work, academic transactions and records. The possible sanctions include, but are not limited to, appropriate grade penalties, course failure (indicated on the transcript as a grade of E), course failure due to academic dishonesty (indicated on the transcript as a grade ofXE), loss of registration privileges, disqualification and dismissal. For more information, see http://provost.asu.edu/academicintegrity.

STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT: Students are expected to act in accordance with the Student Code of Conduct. For detailed information about the Student Code of Conduct and Student Disciplinary Procedures, please refer to: http://www.asu.edu/aad/manuals/ssm/ssm104-01.html

DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS: Qualified students with disabilities who will require disability accommodations in this class are encouraged to make their requests to me at the beginning of the semester either during office hours or by appointment. Note: Prior to receiving disability accommodations, verification of eligibility from the Disability Resource Center (DRC) is required. Disability information is confidential.

Establishing Eligibility for Disability Accommodations: Students who feel they will need disability accommodations in this class but have not registered with the Disability Resource Center (DRC) should contact DRC immediately. Their office is located on the first floor of the Matthews Center Building. DRC staff can also be reached at: 480-965-1234 (V), 480-965-9000 (TTY). For additional information, visit: www.asu.edu/studentaffairs/ed/drc. Their hours are 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM, Monday through Friday.
Social Psychology and Multiculturalism

Maykel Verkuyten*

Utrecht University

Abstract
Questions of multiculturalism give rise to lively and important debates in many countries and in many spheres of life. Diversity is considered desirable and necessary for the development of secure ethnic identities and positive intergroup relations, but is also challenged for being inequitable and a threat to social cohesion. After considering conceptions of multiculturalism and relevant country differences, the paper discusses social psychological research on multicultural attitudes and the effect of multiculturalism on intergroup relations. Subsequently, three issues are addressed that are central in debates about multiculturalism and that present additional topics for social psychological research. The first concerns the importance of intragroup processes, the second the nature of religious identity and Islam in particular, and the third issue relates to tolerance and civil liberties.

How to incorporate immigrant minorities and how to deal with cultural diversity? That is a question that is hotly debated in many societies and in all kinds of settings, such as cities, neighbourhoods, organizations and schools. One answer to this question is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism comes in many variations but in one way or another they all focus on differences and the benefits of diversity. As a principle, multiculturalism emphasizes equality between and respect for the pluralism of cultures and group identities. Multiculturalism is argued for in terms of positive intergroup relations and 'productive diversity' claiming that it represents an important national, organizational or commercial asset. It would also represent a crucial condition for learning and for the development of cultural competence (Fowles & Davidov, 2006). Multiculturalism has also been criticized, for example, for supporting orthodox in-group factions, ignoring internal diversity, as well as legitimizing illiberal internal rules and in-group oppression, particularly of women and children (Barry, 2001; Okin, 1999; Reich, 2002). Furthermore, it has been suggested that multiculturalism can lead to refined and essentialist group distinctions that promote group stereotyping and negative out-group feelings and that endangers social unity and cohesion in society (e.g. Brewer, 1997). Thus, multiculturalism is offered by some scholars as the solution to incorporating immigrants and managing cultural diversity (e.g. Parekh, 2000), while for
others it is in itself an exacerbating cause of conflict (e.g. Huntington, 2004).

What do social psychologists have to say about all this? What kind of multicultural issues do social psychologists examine and what has received less attention? This paper will first discuss some country differences that can have implications for social psychological findings. Then, a short overview of the existing social psychological research on multiculturalism is given with an emphasis on multiculturalism attitudes and intergroup relations. Subsequently, I will discuss three topics that are central in debates about multiculturalism but less so in social psychological research on cultural diversity: intragroup processes, religious identity and tolerance. Many of the research examples that I will give are concerned with the Dutch context. One reason is that most of our research is conducted in this country. Another reason is that the most overt and ambitious European experiment in multiculturalism was developed in the Netherlands but the recent retreat of multiculturalism is also most evident in this country (Joppke, 2004).

Multi-Multiculturalisms

'Multicultural' and 'multiculturalism' are ubiquitous terms. They are heard in political debates, in the language of ethnic group leaders, in local government strategies and budgets, in educational settings, in health care, in popular media, in commercial marketing and in scientific publications. The widespread use of the terms 'multicultural' and 'multiculturalism' can be seen as marking a significant change in the discourses in which societies, schools, organizations, and so on, describe and understand themselves. However, given the wide range of actors, contexts, interpretations and usages of these terms, it is apparent that there is no single view or strategy implied. Multiculturalism can mean many things and can refer to practices, policies, attitudes, beliefs and ideologies. The different meanings and interpretations has led to the use of adjectives for distinguishing between forms of multiculturalism, such as 'critical and difference' multiculturalism (Turner, 1993), 'cosmopolitan and pluralist' multiculturalism (Hollinger, 2000) and 'liberal and illiberal' multiculturalism (Appiah, 2005).

In addition, policies and ideologies regarding diversity, minorities and culture vary greatly from one society to another (see Baubock, Heller, & Zolberg, 1996). Societies do not have the same history, the same collective representations of the nation and the same minority groups. These differences can affect processes of integration and people's attitudes. Social psychological research has shown, for example, that evaluations of multiculturalism and the endorsement of minority rights are influenced by categories of minority groups and the ways in which they are defined (Augoustinos & Quinn, 2003; Verkuyten, 2005a). Not all minority groups
are perceived to have equal moral claims. Multicultural recognition and rights is considered a more appropriate demand for ‘involuntary’ groups (original inhabitants, descendents of slaves, refugees) than for immigrant workers. These immigrants would have waived their demands and rights by voluntary leaving their country of origin. Self-determination implies a personal responsibility for one’s situation and position. Therefore, multiculturalism and minority rights tend to be endorsed less in relation to immigrant workers than in relation to involuntary minorities.

In the beginning of the 1970s, multiculturalism developed into an explicit political strategy in Canada that was formalized in the Multiculturalism Act in the 1980s. The idea spread to other immigration countries such as Australia and the USA, and multiculturalism developed into an official government policy term in the former but not in the latter country. In Australia, the multicultural ideology and policy started to develop in the mid-1970s and was directed against the idea of assimilation of immigrants and the, at the time, existing White Australian Policy. In the USA, the debate on multiculturalism is influenced by the civil rights movement, affirmative action policies, the ‘cultural wars’ in universities and education more generally, and minority-focused identity politics and politics of recognition.

Canada, Australia and the USA are settler societies or traditional countries of immigration. These countries are largely composed of immigrants and (in part) cultural diversity is a defining characteristic of these nations. Particularly in Canada and Australia, there have been attempts to equate ‘national’ with ‘multicultural’. This implies the possibility of a positive association between national identification and the endorsement of multiculturalism. In contrast, in most European countries, there is a long history of established majority groups and issues of integration and cultural diversity are relatively novel. Immigration does not play a role in the national self-image making it more difficult for immigrants to be included and to ‘belong’. European multiculturalism is not so much an identity option for society as a whole but has always been for immigrants and ethnic minorities only. This means that in European countries, there is more often a negative association between national identification and multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2005b). Furthermore, cross-national acculturation research has found a positive association between national and ethnic minority group identification in settler countries, but a negative association in non-settler, European societies (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006).

However, there are also important differences between European countries. For example, it has been argued that in France there is little room for multiculturalism because the republican ideology focuses on individuals as citizens and tries to ‘make Frenchmen out of foreigners’ (Withol de Wenden, 2004). In contrast, countries such as Great Britain and the Netherlands have taken a more supporting view on diversity. As early as 1968, the British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins made a famous
speech in which he advocated a model of integration 'not as a flattening process of uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (Vertovec, 1998, 29). A state-sponsored 'race relations' industry emerged, backed by anti-discrimination legislation, and an emphasis on racial equality. Race was adopted as a category to address minority group disadvantages and was also meant to include immigrants of the Indian Subcontinent.

In the Netherlands, a policy of multiculturalism was adopted in the 1980s in response to the increased influx of 'foreigners'. The recognition that many 'guest worker' migrants would remain in the country led to a policy for 'integration with retention of the own identity' (Entzinger, 2003, 63). Dutch policies saw immigrants according to their group membership and not primarily as individuals. The 'pillarization' tradition of institutionalized pluralism provided a wide range of cultural opportunities and group rights, such as local voting rights for non-nationals and public funding of Islamic schools. However, much has changed since the 1980s. The previous 'ethnic minorities policy' has gradually been replaced by a policy of civic integration with an emphasis on knowledge of Dutch society and command of the Dutch language (Entzinger, 2003). In public debates, multiculturalism has been described as a 'drama' and a 'failure', and assimilation has been proposed as the only viable option (e.g. Schnabel, 2000). This change in political and ideological discourse can have an impact on attitudes towards minority groups and on the patterns of group identification among these groups (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005).

**Multiculturalism Attitudes**

Social psychologists have tended to examine multiculturalism in terms of attitudes and ideologies. Empirical studies on multicultural attitudes indicate that the general support for multiculturalism is not very strong among majority groups in many Western countries. Apart from Canada where majority members have been found to favour multiculturalism (e.g. Berry & Kalin, 1995), studies in other countries have found moderate support, such as in Australia, (e.g. Ho, 1990) and the USA (e.g. Critin Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2006), or low support, such as in Germany, Switzerland, Slovakia and the Netherlands (e.g. Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Pionkowski, Florack, Hoelker, & Obdrzálek, 2000; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998; Zick, Wagner, van Dick, & Petzel, 2001).

Multiculturalism is not only about the majority group accepting and recognizing minority groups, but implies acceptance and recognition on the part of minorities too. Some studies have examined the endorsement of multiculturalism among ethnic minority group members. In many (European) countries, multiculturalism is typically seen as identity threatening for the majority group and identity supporting for minority groups. For
minority groups, multiculturalism offers the possibility of maintaining their own culture and obtaining higher social status in society. Majority group members, on the other hand, may see ethnic minorities and their desire to maintain their own culture as a threat to their cultural dominance and group identity. Following social psychological theories that emphasize the role of group status and interests in the dynamics of intergroup relations (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it can be expected that groups are more in favour of multiculturalism when they see gains for themselves. Hence, it is likely that multiculturalism appeals more to ethnic minority groups than to majority group members, who in turn endorse assimilation more strongly. Several studies in different countries have confirmed this expectation (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; Verkuyten, 2005a, b, c; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006), including a study examining multicultural attitudes among majority and immigrant groups in 21 European countries (Schalk-Soekar, 2007). This group difference in attitudes towards multiculturalism is even stronger among majority and minority individuals who identify relatively strong with their own ethnic group (e.g. Simon, 2004; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006).

This difference in attitudes towards multiculturalism can lead to problematic relational outcomes. A lack of reciprocal attitudes and beliefs with minority groups favouring multiculturalism and majority groups putting more emphasis on assimilation may hamper the realization of a positively diverse and equal society. Acculturation research has traditionally focused on immigrants' cultural changes and acculturation strategies (Berry, 2006). The outcome of the acculturation process depends not only on the immigrants' attitudes but also on the host society's preferences and ideas about what immigrants should do. In their interactive acculturation model, Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, and Senecal (1997) argue that intergroup relations between immigrants and majority groups are best predicted by the relative fit of immigrant strategy preferences and host society strategy preferences. According to this model, the fit can be consensual, problematic or conflictual. Research has shown that an increased mismatch between host and immigrant preferred strategies yields more negative intergroup relations (e.g. Pionkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002; Zagefska & Brown, 2002).

**Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations**

A central aim of multiculturalism is to provide and promote a context for group acceptance and recognition. According to Berry (2006), multiculturalism tries to create a feeling of confidence among everyone living in a plural society. This confidence involves a sense of trust and acceptance of the other. In contrast, a lack of confidence implies feelings of threat and increased rejection of out-groups. Thus, multiculturalism is expected to
contribute to favourable intergroup relations. There is supporting evidence for this in educational settings (e.g. Hogan & Mallott, 2005) and also in social psychological research. Using survey data in the USA, Wolsko et al. (2006), for example, found that people who endorse multiculturalism see ethnic groups as more different from each other, but at the same time, view ethnic out-groups in a more positive manner. Thus, the group thinking inherent in multiculturalism seems to promote perceived group differences as well as a reduced tendency to evaluate the in-group more positively than the out-group. This latter association differs, however, between majority and minority groups. The endorsement of multiculturalism was associated with lesser evaluative bias for majority group participants than for ethnic minorities. Furthermore, in two studies in the Netherlands, it was found that the more strongly ethnic minority members endorsed the ideology of multiculturalism, the more likely they were to evaluate the in-group positively. In contrast, the more the Dutch majority participants endorsed multiculturalism the more likely they tended to be to evaluate the out-group positively (Verkuyten, 2005b).

These associations do not tell us anything about causal effects. A few experimental studies have directly examined the effects of multiculturalism on intergroup relations. Wolsko and colleagues (2000), for example, examined the impact of exposure to multicultural and colour-blind ideologies on intergroup judgements among white participants in the USA. They found stronger stereotyping and greater use of category information in their multicultural condition compared to colour-blindness. In addition, compared to the control participants, there was less pro-white attitudinal bias in both ideological conditions. Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) also studied white participants, examining them for automatic and explicit forms of racial attitudes. Participants exposed to a message endorsing colour-blindness showed greater racial bias on both forms of racial attitudes than those exposed to a message endorsing a multicultural perspective.

Both these studies were limited to white participants and the American context. In two studies in the Netherlands, an experimental questionnaire design was used in which multicultural and assimilation ideology were made salient in separate conditions (Verkuyten, 2005b). Multicultural recognition emphasizes a positive view of cultural maintenance by ethnic minority groups and acknowledges the distinctive identities of these groups. Hence, it can be expected that exposure to multicultural messages affects majority group members’ out-group evaluation and minority group members’ in-group evaluation particularly. Thus, the minority group participants were expected to show more positive in-group evaluation in the multicultural experimental condition than in the assimilation condition. In contrast, the majority group participants were expected to show less positive out-group evaluation in the assimilation condition than in the multicultural condition. The results of both studies were in agreement with the expectations. Hence, for both groups of
participants, multiculturalism was related primarily to the evaluation of the ethnic minority group rather than the majority group. This is in agreement with the multiculturalism discussion in the Netherlands and in other West European countries that focuses on the identity and societal position of ethnic minority groups.

These findings indicate that multiculturalism can have positive effects on intergroup relations, particularly for the evaluation of ethnic minority groups. However, multiculturalism raises many additional issues that have received less attention of social psychologists. Intragroup processes, the role of religious identity and (in)tolerance of concrete practices are among the more important issues and present three directions for social psychological research on multiculturalism.

Intragroup Processes

Research on multiculturalism tends to focus on intergroup issues in which minority group acceptance, recognition and positive evaluation are key terms. This is in agreement with social psychological perspectives, such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), that are centrally concerned with relations between groups that differ in position, status or power. However, multiculturalism has important intragroup implications and is fuelled by dynamics inside cultural communities. Group identities are fundamentally shaped by interactions with co-ethnics and by discourses about ethnic and cultural authenticity (Verkuyten, 2005c). Ethnic minority group membership involves issues of in-group acceptance and support as well as in-group obligations and pressures. Furthermore, multiculturalism has been criticized for supporting and justifying conservatism and repressive in-group practices (e.g. Barry, 2001). The emphasis on cultural maintenance and equality of cultures and the recognition of cultural diversity can legitimize, for example, the inequality of women (e.g. Okin, 1999) and authoritarian and insular childrearing practices (Reich, 2002).

In multiculturalism, a communitarian perspective is typically taken. Constituent cultural communities would provide the central context within which identities are shaped and the moral framework for self-understanding is provided. Only through having access to their own culture, the argument goes, people would have access to a range of meaningful options and, therefore, would be able to develop a secure and positive sense of self (Parekh, 2000). Hence, a particular group identity is prioritized and the recognition of this identity would sustains feelings of self-respect and self-esteem. But what about individuals that do not (want to) identify with their ethnic minority group but emphasize personal autonomy and individualism? For them, the group thinking inherent in multiculturalism and the emphasis on cultural identities might be
threatening. Individual mobility, for example, implies a disidentification with the ethnic in-group and a focus on personal characteristics and qualities as a basis of positive self-esteem. Among ethnic minority group members, individualism has been found to be negatively related to the endorsement of multiculturalism (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006). Furthermore, in two experimental studies, it was found that multiculturalism does provide an unfavourable context for low minority group identifiers to feel good about themselves (Verkuyten, 2007a). Thus, multicultural recognition has something to offer to high minority group identifiers but appears to be threatening to the self-esteem of low minority group identifiers.

Multiculturalism is not only problematic for some minority individuals but also tends to recognize and legitimize a particular version of group cultures, one that holds sway in more traditional circles. The focus is on cultural communities and their ‘essential’ or authentic group identity. Social psychological research has shown that for ethnic minority groups, a stronger endorsement of multiculturalism is associated with higher perceived in-group essentialism (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Cultural essentialism allows multicultural notions to be used for claiming the right to cultural identity and the recognition of fundamental differences. The deconstruction of ethnicity and an emphasis on internal cultural heterogeneity is not very useful for those who want to make group claims and mobilize around notions of cultural recognition and rights. As a result ‘many exponents of identity politics are fundamentalists – in the language of the academy, “essentialists”’ (Gidin, 1995, 164), and ‘in basing itself on relatively permanent groups ... [multiculturalism] mirror[s] the very prejudices it opposes’ (Wrong, 1997, 298). In multiculturalist policies and practices, there is a tendency of essentialist group thinking and to ignore the internal diversity and the critical, but less powerful, voices within communities. The notion of a singular ‘ethnic or cultural community’ belies the internal differences and tensions that exists and contradicts the liberal ideal of individual choice and voice.

Thus, there are many important and interesting intragroup issues that social psychologist can and should study when examining issues of multiculturalism. Rather than taking cultural groups and identities for granted social psychologists should examine how group understandings are produced and shaped by various community members in a vibrant field of identity debates and positions.

Religion

Discussions about multiculturalism and group rights often subsume the question of religion under those of cultural diversity or explicitly exclude religion from the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994). Multiculturalism tends to exclude faith and faith identities (Modood & Ahmad, 2007), and the same can be said about acculturation research. Questions of diversity,
however, are increasingly questions of religious diversity. In particular, Islam has emerged as the focus of immigration and diversity debates in Europe (Zolberg & Long, 1999). This is illustrated by the Rushdie affair in Britain, the headscarf controversy in France, the debate about the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, and the national debates about Islamic schools and the place of other Islamic institutions, practices and claims within the deeply embedded secularism of most liberal democracies. It is clear that Islam has moved to the centre of debates and politics in European countries and is at the heart of what is perceived as a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ (Modood & Ahmad, 2007). The Dutch majority, for example, considers ‘unequal’ gender practices and some family practices among Muslims as morally wrong, whereas Muslim immigrants reject the corresponding ‘liberal’ practices of the Dutch (e.g. Sniderman & Hagedoorn, 2007). Both groups see the same differences in, for example, family practices and values but evaluate these in opposite terms. A recent nation wide survey showed that 50% of the Dutch as well as 50% of the Muslim immigrants consider the Western and Muslim way of life as opposites that do not go together (Gijbels, 2005).

Religious differences are increasingly being seen as contradictory and insurmountable. Muslim minorities know that the majority group reject some of their values and practices and the majority group knows that Muslims reject some of theirs. The result is a situation in which, for example, more than half of the Dutch majority population declares to have unfavourable opinions about Muslims (Pew Project, 2005), and more than half of Dutch Muslims report to have clear negative feelings towards Jews and non-believers (Verkuyten, 2007b). As Sniderman and Hagedoorn (2007, 26) conclude from their large-scale research ‘there are parallel barriers of prejudice: a desire of many Western Europeans to hold Muslims at a distance combined with a desire of Muslims to keep their distance’.

Among a representative sample from the city of Rotterdam, Phalet and Güngör (2004) found that Islam was considered ‘very meaningful and important’ in one’s life by 87% of the Turkish and 96% of the Moroccan population. In addition, around two thirds of the Turks and Moroccans had a very strong Muslim identity. Furthermore, in two Dutch studies (Verkuyten, 2007b; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007), it was found that around half of the Muslim participants had the highest possible score on a Muslim identification measure that consisted of six items that are commonly used in social psychological research (e.g. ‘My Muslim identity is an important part of my self’, and ‘I identify strongly with Muslims’). Furthermore, around 45% had the highest possible score on statements such as ‘the fact that I am a Muslim is the most important thing in my life’, and ‘being a Muslim is the only thing that really matters in my life’. These scores indicate ceiling level group identification and shows that it can be problematic to follow the standard practice in social psychological research.
and treat group identification as a continuous variable. For the great majority of Muslims, Muslim identity is a given and not being a Muslim is not a real option. The same has been found in studies in Brussels, Belgium (Phalet, 2004), and in other European countries (Haddad & Smith, 2001; Vertovec & Rogers, 1999).

The strong Muslim identification found is probably related to global and national developments. The increased global tensions and divergences between the Western and Islamic world forces European Muslims to a position of having to defend and stress their religion. In addition, the public condemnation of Islam and the plea for assimilation in the Netherlands has increased the salience and importance of Muslim identification (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Islamic immigrant groups face high levels of threat to the value of their religious identity that leads to increased in-group identification among these groups and a politicized religious identity.

However, the total religious identification found is probably also related to the nature of monotheistic religions in general, and Islam in particular. Religion is often of profound importance to people’s lives and religious groups are among the more salient buttresses of identity. As argued by Seul (1999, 553), religions ‘supply cosmologies, moral frameworks, institutions, rituals, traditions, and other identity-supporting content that answers to individuals’ needs for psychological stability in the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and even self-actualization’. Very strong Muslim identification among West European immigrants was also found in the 1990s when the religious group tensions were much less (e.g. Modood et al., 1997). In addition, being a Muslim seems to imply a normative group commitment that is related to Islamic religion. For many Muslims, the declaration of faith (Shahada) in front of two witnesses symbolizes one’s belief and commitment to Islam: one either is a Muslim who is committed to Islam or one is not. Religion is about convictions and divine truths, and for most observant believers, the core of the religious identity is non-negotiable making the idea of religious changes or compromises an oxymoron.

The success of multiculturalism depends on the existence of a larger society to which all groups belong. The recognition and valuing of group identities requires a sense of shared commonalities. Thus, a key question is whether it is possible to be at the same time a Muslim and a member of a (European) nation. Are Muslims accepted as co-nationals and do they want to belong? These questions are, of course, related because people who feel accepted do more easily want to belong. For the majority group, the question of loyalty to the nation is often central. Suspicions of disloyalty or a lack of commitment of European Muslims show up everywhere in society, in many countries, and seem to have a basis in reality. Almost half of the non-Muslim Dutch majority believe that Muslim immigrants are loyal to their country of origin and not to the
Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). As a kind of mirror image, around 50% of Dutch Muslims have been found to have low identification with the Dutch, and around 40% showed high disidentification in which a so-called oppositional identity is developed (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). In addition, research has found that, for example, in Great Britain and Germany, the great majority of Muslims consider themselves primarily a Muslim rather than a citizen of their country (Pew Project, 2006).

Thus, many Muslim minorities wish to live in liberal Western societies but not really be part of them. One important reason is that they feel rejected and discriminated making them turn away from the society in which they live and even the Western world in general. This seems especially likely among young Muslims who have been born and raised, and are fully integrated in society, but feel that they are not really accepted and considered to belong (Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006). The patterns of racist exclusion and ethnic nationalism in many European countries do not make it easy to be a Muslim and a national at the same time. Another reason is that some Muslims argue that their religious tenets conflict with principles of a liberal democracy and, therefore, that they are not bound by these principles. A ‘true’ Islam is defined in contrast to Western thinking and a ‘true’ Muslim must distance him- or herself from the West. There is a clear conflict within Muslim groups between a growing minority that does not accept the norms of Western democracy and a moderate majority that does (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, & Ja’far, 2007). There is also growing evidence and concern about the increasing anti-Semitism and intolerance of sexual freedoms and homosexuals among Muslims living in Western countries (Schoenfeld, 2004). Compromises on the issue of sexuality is unacceptable for many Muslims who want to maintain their Islamic identities.

In Europe, questions of multiculturalism are increasingly questions of religious differences, and Islam in particular. Social psychology has paid relatively little attention to the nature of religious identity and to interreligious relations (but see, for example, Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 2006; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005; Verkuyten, 2007b). This is unfortunate because religion is an important dimension for developing a positive social identity and religion is an important factor in social divisions and conflicts in many societies around the world. In addition, a study of religious identification can make a contribution to our thinking about the important process of group identification. For example, by questioning the standard practice of assuming that group identification is a continuous variable or a matter of degree.

**Tolerance**

Social psychological research on multiculturalism tends to focus on multicultural attitudes, stereotypes and intergroup attitudes. Typically,
people are asked how they perceive and evaluate ethnic out-groups and it is examined whether an emphasis on the importance of acknowledging and respecting cultural diversity improves intergroup relations. Commentators and politicians, however, express worries about the relationship between democracy and multiculturalism. Cultural and religious pluralism is identified as an important obstacle for democratization because people can develop attachments to groups that are, in one way or another, inimical to democracy. This would be symbolized by the debate on free speech in relation to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, the fatwa against the British novelist Salman Rushdie, and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. In Great Britain, a recent survey showed that 28% of Muslim youth prefer to live under sharia law and 42% agreed that sharia law is absolute and should not be interpreted to fit in with Western values (Mirza et al., 2007). Furthermore, 56% agreed that a Muslim women may not marry a non-Muslim, and 36% believed that apostasy is forbidden and punishable by death.

The hotly debated questions and issues related to multiculturalism are about concrete practices and actions. Should it be allowed that Sikhs wear a turban rather than a helmet on construction sites or a crash helmet when riding a motorcycle; should the practice of forced marriages among some immigrant groups be accepted; should it be accepted that Muslim teachers refuse to shake hands with children’s parents of the opposite sex; should very light forms of female circumcision (sunna) be allowed; should all images of pigs be banned from pictures in public offices because these might offend Muslims’ feelings; should it be allowed that civil servants wear a headscarf and that students wear a burqa or a niqab. It is around these concrete questions that multiculturalism is put to the test and ways of life can collide.

Social psychological research tends to focus on group perceptions and evaluations, and on the endorsement of multiculturalism, assimilation and colour-blindness as abstract ideological notions and principles. However, as is well known from attitude research (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), principle considerations differ from (the lack of) support for practical implications and situations. Studies on political thinking and behaviour, for example, show that people tend to support democratic rights in the abstract but often do not endorse the same rights in concrete circumstances (see Vogt, 1997). It is one thing to endorse the freedom of speech and demonstration in general, and another thing to apply these freedoms to, for example, radical Muslim groups living in a secular or Christian country. In trying to maximize the relevance and validity of research, social psychology should examine how people perceive and reason about these concrete issues. For example, by focusing on the topic of (political) tolerance and by using questionnaires as well as experimental designs.

Tolerance can be conceptualized in various ways, such as the valuing and celebrating of difference, the absence of prejudice and the putting up
with something that one disapproves of or is prejudiced against. The latter meaning of tolerance is a key condition for citizenship and democracy (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Tolerance for dissenting beliefs and practices is not the absence of prejudice but rather a separate construct that emphasizes forbearance and not begrudging other people their own ways. Tolerance is an option when one dislikes something or someone and is the opposite of discrimination; when one endures or refrains from action although other's beliefs and practices are disapproved of or rejected. This kind of tolerance is crucial because it is the first and necessary step towards civility and a foundation for a diverse and just society (Vogt, 1997). People may disagree with one another, may have stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes but should at least agree about how to disagree. Historically, the concept of tolerance evolved from efforts to deal with the harmful and violent effects of religious conflicts (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The presence of a great number of Muslims in Western European countries has given a renewed urgency to the idea of tolerance as a mechanism for dealing with diversity.

It is often argued that freedoms and rights characterize Western democratic societies and are of minimal concern to Muslims, or even contradictory to Islam (see Turiel, 2002). The right-based morality of Western societies would differ from the duty-based morality of Islam. There are some empirical findings that seem to support this line of thinking. These findings indicate that European Muslims are much less tolerant for dissenting beliefs and practices and for freedom of speech than non-Muslims. Among a representative sample from the city of Rotterdam, it was found, for example, that 75% of the ethnic Dutch, but only around 10% of the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims, agreed that it should be allowed that a magazine uses drawings and words to make God and religion ridiculous (Phalet & Güngör, 2004). This suggests that, compared to the ethnic Dutch, the two Muslim groups endorse core principles of civil liberties much less.

However, for two reasons these kind of findings should be interpreted with great care. First, developmental and political science research has shown that tolerance is not a global construct. Tolerance depends on whom, what and when people are asked to tolerate dissenting beliefs and practices. For example, Wainryb, Shaw, and Maianu (1998) found that adolescents tolerated the holding of beliefs about harmful practices more than acting on these beliefs, and that they were more tolerant towards dissenting information than dissenting moral values. The same has been found in an experimental study among ethnic Dutch adolescents examining tolerant judgements of Muslims’ political rights and dissenting beliefs and practices (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007a). Participants took into account various aspects of what they were asked to tolerate and the sense in which they should be tolerant. The type of actor, the nature of the social implication of the behaviour, and the underlying belief type all
made a difference to the tolerant judgements. For example, the level of tolerance was lower when the social implications were greater, and participants were more tolerant of practices based on dissenting informational beliefs than on dissenting moral beliefs. Furthermore, participants were more tolerant of people campaigning for public support for a particular practice (e.g. differential treatment of sons and daughters) than for the actual act itself.

The intergroup context is the second reason why findings on the endorsement of civil liberties by Muslims should be interpreted with care. In another study, we examined how non-Muslim and Muslim adolescents living in the Netherlands reason about civil liberties, including free speech, using concrete cases and publicly debated issues (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007b). The differences found between the Muslim and non-Muslim participants were in agreement with their specific group positions in Dutch society. The rejection of freedom of speech was stronger among the Muslim than the non-Muslim participants when it involved offending God and religion and when it concerned Islam. Their support for civil liberties were quite similar to non-Muslims, however, when their religious group was not at stake but involved, for example, general psychological and physical harm. Thus, the results did not support the idea that freedoms and rights are of little concern to Muslims or contradictory to Islam (see also Turiel & Wainryb, 1998).

These findings for tolerance and civil liberties show that it is important to examine the social reasoning behind the evaluation of cultural practices. Social psychological research on multiculturalism tends to focus on stereotypes and group evaluations. What is also needed, however, is an understanding of the underlying criteria that people use to determine whether particular acts and practices are acceptable. Social domain theory (see Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2002), for example, proposes that people use moral (e.g. fairness, justice), social-conventional (e.g. group norms, traditions) and psychological (e.g. self-understanding, preferences) reasoning to evaluate and reason about specific behaviours and situations. Hence, a combination of social psychological intergroup theories and social domain theory (see Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2005) might improve our understanding of the many and hotly debated multicultural controversies.

**Conclusion**

Multiculturalism is concerned with complex issues that involve many questions and dilemmas. There are promises and there are important pitfalls. Considering the psychological and social importance of ethnic and racial identities, a focus on groups and group differences is understandable and, to a certain extent, useful, for example, for improving intergroup relations. It can, however, also lead to a situation in which these identities
become overwhelming or unidimensional and society, out-groups and in-groups oblige people to place this particular identity in the forefront of their minds and make it central in their behaviour. Multiculturalism can turn into an obsession with differences and group identities, leading to a widening of divisions between groups and a hampering of individual choices and opportunities.

Multiculturalism is about the delicate balance between recognizing differences and developing meaningful communalities, between differential treatment and equality, between group identities and individual liberties. There are different kinds of diversity and different forms of multiculturalism that try to accommodate cultural differences. Some differences are relatively easy to accept and to recognize, but others go against moral convictions and basic premises of society. There are limits to pluralism and moral diversity as there are limits to tolerance and what is acceptable. Tolerance does not imply the relativism found in some forms of multiculturalism that celebrate diversity and argue that one should refrain from value judgements in assessing other groups. Tolerance always has limits and does not imply a full acceptance and valuing of all social practices of other groups, such as potentially harmful activities, illiberal internal rules and undemocratic actions.

The debate on the way to manage cultural diversity continues and social psychologists increasingly try to make a contribution to these debates. In doing so, it is important to examine not only ethnic and cultural identities and intergroup relations, but also to focus on differences within groups and intragroup processes, on the ways that religious identities are understood and used in society and for organizing collective action, and on people’s reasoning about tolerance and civil liberties related to concrete dissenting practices and behaviours.

Short Biography
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Endnote
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ONE OF THE MANY SIGNS OF THE RIGHTWARD CREEP OF WESTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS is the recent unison of voices denouncing multiculturalism. German Chancellor Angela Merkel led off last October by claiming that multiculturalism “has failed and failed utterly.” She was echoed in February by British Prime Minister David Cameron. All three were late to the game, though; for years, the Dutch far right has been bashing supposedly multicultural policies.

Despite the shared rhetoric, it is difficult to discern a common target for these criticisms. Cameron aimed at an overly tolerant attitude toward ex- Turkish integration, and Sarkozy at Muslims who pray in the street.

But while it is hard to know what exactly the politicians of Europe mean when they talk about multiculturalism, one thing we do know is that the issues they raise—real or imagined—have complex historical roots that have little to do with ideologies.
culturalism may be politically useful because of its populist appeal, but it is also politically dangerous because it attacks "an enemy within": Islam and Muslims. Moreover, it misreads history. An intellectual corrective may help to diminish its malign impact.

Political criticisms of multiculturalism confuse three objects. One is the changing cultural and religious landscape of Europe. Postwar France and Britain encouraged immigration of willing workers from former colonies; Germany drew on its longstanding ties with Turkey for the same purpose; somewhat later, new African and Asian immigrants, many of them Muslims, traveled throughout Western Europe to seek jobs or political refuge. As a result, one sees mosques where there once were only churches and hears Arabic and Turkish where once there were only dialects of German, Dutch, or Italian. The first object then is the social fact of cultural and religious diversity, of multicultural and multi-religious everyday life: the emergence in Western Europe of the kind of social diversity that has long been a matter of pride in the United States.

The second object—suggested by Cameron's phrase "state multiculturalism"—concerns the policies each of these countries have used to handle new residents. By the 1970s, Western European governments realized that the new workers and their families were there to stay, so the host countries tried out a number of strategies to integrate the immigrants into the host society. Policymakers all realized that they would need to find what later came to be called "reasonable accommodations" with the needs of the new communities: for mosques and schools, job training, instruction in the host country language. These were pragmatic efforts; they did not aim at assimilation, nor did they aim to preserve spatial or cultural separation. Some of these policies eventually were termed "multicultural" because they involved recognizing ethnic community structures or allowing the use of Arabic or Turkish in schools. But these measures were all designed to encourage integration: to bring new groups in while acknowledging the obvious facts of linguistic, social, cultural, and religious difference.

The third object that multiculturalism's critics confuse is a set of normative theories of multiculturalism, each of which attempts to mark out a way to take account of cultural and religious diversity from a particular philosophical point of view. Although ideas of multiculturalism do shape public debates in Britain (as they do in North America), they do so much less in continental Europe, and even in Britain it would be difficult to find direct policy effects of these normative theories.

Politicians err when they claim that normative ideas of multiculturalism shape the social fact of cultural and religious diversity: such diversity would be present with or without a theory to cope with it. Nor are state policies shaped by those ideas, which tend to be recent in origin. Quite to the contrary, each European country has followed well-traveled pathways for dealing with diversity. Methods designed to accommodate sub-national religious blocs are now being adapted and applied to Muslim immigrants. Far from neotraditional, misguided policies of multiculturalism, these distinct strategies represent the continuation of long-standing, nation-specific ways of recognizing and managing diversity.

CONSIDER THE CASE of Germany. Merkel's claims were perhaps the least weighty, but her words point to a growing conviction among some Germans that Muslim immigrants are inassimilable. Merkel's attack was as vague as it was opportunistic. She regretted that the German "tendency had been to say, 'let's adopt the multicultural concept and live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other'" and concluded that this attitude had not produced results, as if she had thereby identified policies that could be changed. Her real meaning was made clear by the presence of Horst Seehofer next to her on the podium. Seehofer, the Bavarian state premier and Merkel's coalition partner, has called for curtailing immigration.

Merkel's speech followed a series of anti-Muslim public statements by high-placed German officials. In June 2010 then-Bundestag member Thilo Sarrazin published a book in which he accused Muslim immigrants of lowering the intelligence of German society. Although he was censured for his views and dismissed from his central bank position, the book proved popular, and polls suggested that Germans were sympathetic with the thrust of his arguments. One poll showed a third of Germans believed the country was "overrun by foreigners." A few months earlier, in March, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble waded in to say that Germany had been mistaken to let in so many Turkish workers in the 1960s because they had not integrated into society.

At least the finance minister pointed to a real German policy, one that encouraged low-paid laborers to relocate to the country and rebuild it. But Merkel's notion that the German government had promoted a multikulti society (as distinct from celebrating colorful Kreuzberg or a Turkish star on the German soccer team)
ignores the brunt of German immigration policy, which, until 2000, denied citizenship to those workers, their children, and their grandchildren. In other words, the government and many, perhaps most, Germans had not hoped, as Merkel claimed, that everyone would live side by side. Rather, the hope was that they would just pack up and leave.

In this sense Germany has largely

followed its longer-term policies for dealing with diversity: German federal and state governments have historically denied that immigration could be of value and maintained a policy of limiting citizenship only to those who could demonstrate German descent. But Germany may also follow the public corporation model it has arranged with Christian and Jewish groups. A proposed Islamic public corporation would have the legal status to obtain government funding for mosques and would serve as a legitimate overseer of materials selected for Islamic religious education. This promising policy goal, not yet achieved, would recognize and support Islam in accordance with long-standing German principles governing religious diversity, not on grounds of multiculturalism.

IN CONTRAST TO Germany, Britain has promoted multiculturalism as an explicit policy, but not in those domains where Cameron denounced it. In his February 2011 speech, Cameron blamed multiculturalism for creating spatial divisions and fomenting terrorism. "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, he claimed, "we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream." Left apart, some have submitted to extremism, he argued, and some of those extremists have in turn carried bombs in the name of Islam. His solution was three-fold: ensure that any organization asking for public money subscribes to doctrines of universal rights and encourages integration, keep extremists from reaching students and prisoners, and ensure that everyone learns English.

As a diagnosis of problems of homegrown terrorism, the speech fell short. The British bombers principally responsible for the 2005 attacks in London knew English and English people well. Mohammad Sidique Khan, believed to be the leader of the bombing plot, was recalled as a "highly Westernized" man who grew up in Leeds and attended university there. Shehzad Tanweer, another of the bombers, had a similar background. According to the official report on the bombings, both men had developed jihadist convictions in Pakistan.

If these and other homegrown terrorists have problems feeling at home in Britain, it is because they do not remain in their "separate cultures" but instead become isolated individuals without a social or cultural base. In otherwise distinct analyses of European jihadists, French political scientist Olivier Roy and American counter-terrorism expert Marc Sageman each paint a picture of young men who suffer from a lack of ties with others in their communities. Roy calls them "deterioralized"; Sageman describes a "bunch of guys" who find themselves without opportunities at home, who are considered foreigners despite being born in Europe, and who end up traveling abroad to seek out extremists. Hardly walled off in enclaves in Bradford (or Hamburg), they are free-floating, perfect speakers of English (or German) who feel themselves rejected by the people and institutions around them.

Cameron used his speech to argue for his "Big Society"—policies of state disinvestment from welfare predicated on the belief that if people have to work together to survive they will gain a stronger sense of being British. But whatever the merits of this approach to British social ills, it has little to offer individuals who already consider themselves discarded by those around them.

So Cameron got it wrong when it comes to homegrown terrorism. What did he have in mind when he spoke of "state multiculturalism"? Multicultural policies in Britain today mainly concern how state schools handle their diverse clientele: teaching cultural and religious studies curricula, offering halal meals to Muslim pupils. Behind these specific policies is the notion, generally accepted in Britain, that the cultural and religious traditions of each pupil should be positively recognized. These politics find one salient expression in a commissioned white paper by the political theorist Bhikhu Parekh, whose 2000 book, Rethinking Multiculturalism, asks: in a multicultural society, how should the state balance legitimate claims to diversity with the need to "foster a strong sense of unity and common belonging among its citizens"? This is precisely Cameron's concern, but Parekh voices it as a justification for educational multiculturalism. Parekh argues that recognizing the traditions held by religious and ethnic communities through multicultural school curricula
provides a psychologically sound basis on which to construct an inclusive national identity. (His view comes close to claims made by another political theorist, Will Kymlicka, who argues that maintaining cultural heritage is of psychosocial importance in the development of a liberal citizen.)

There is controversy in Britain about schooling and the isolation of cultural minorities, but spatial segregation of immigrant communities was a product of South Asian settlement patterns in Britain in the 1960s and '70s, not state multiculturalism. When men (and later, families) moved from Pakistan and Bangladesh to Britain, they brought whole lineages and villages along with them, reproducing their old linguistic and religious networks in urban British neighborhoods. The result was a chasm separating Asian and white communities, and in some cities this absence of interaction and understanding spiraled into hatred and unrest. In the spring and summer of 2001, riots pitted Asians against whites in the northern cities of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford. Today, these cities remain highly segregated. Their schools reflect and exacerbate the problem. Pupils remain sorted into largely white and largely Pakistani or Bangladeshi schools. As one head teacher at a 92 percent Pakistani primary school said in a report released on the tenth anniversary of the riots, “Some of our children could live their lives without meeting someone from another culture until they go to high school or even the workplace.”

The combination of religion and schooling contributes to this segregation, but not in the way that Cameron’s speech suggests: it’s not just Muslims who’ve cut themselves off from the rest of society. Across Britain a large percentage of children go to schools that only admit students who regularly attend a Catholic or an Anglican church. In sharply segregated Oldham, 40 percent of secondary schools are of this type, and they draw from a largely white population. This religious divide is increasing, due to the addition to the school scene of state-supported “Faith academies,” mainly Church of England and Catholic schools. Whereas in the United States government support for religiously exclusive schools would be judged as excessive entanglement of the state with religion, British ideas of public life start from the premise that religious communities are legitimate and socially important sources of citizen education, and thus deserving of state aid.

Thus, if state multiculturalism exists in 2011, it would be found in broadly accepted principles about the role of state support in promoting diverse kinds of schools. These policies can have segregating effects, but they are also current Tory policies. Cameron and his Party don’t like to bring them up in other contexts, though; they are not in the business of attacking Christian schools.

On the whole, then, it seems that accommodation of immigrants in Britain has taken the usual course for that nation. The methods applied to

BRITISH IDEAS OF PUBLIC LIFE START FROM THE PREMISE THAT RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES ARE LEGITIMATE SOURCES OF CITIZEN EDUCATION.
FOR THE DUTCH RIGHT, ATTACKING ISLAM IS A PSYCHOLOGICALLY USEFUL WAY OF REWORKING THEIR OWN HERITAGE.

the validity of recognizing cultural diversity but rather the degree to which the state ought to allow extreme or intolerant public speech, the same issue that arose thanks to the Danish cartoons controversy and that regularly figures in laws against Holocaust denial.

ALTHOUGH FRENCH President Nicolas Sarkozy attacked le multiculturalisme, more often French politicians use the term "communialism" (communautarisme). This refers not to the North American philosophy of communitarianism, although that takes its bumps sometimes as well, but to everyday practices and attitudes that reject "living together" in favor of "living side by side." Usually Britain is the negative example, though of late the French have been blaming themselves for this supposed deficiency as well.

But communialism is no more precise an object of denunciation than is multiculturalism. In Le Monde on March 16 of this year, the new Interior Minister, Claude Guéant, said that high unemployment among those who come to France from outside the European Union proves "the failure of communialism" because these immigrants tend to clump together by culture and so keeps them from getting jobs. He acknowledged that people chose where to live, that the state did not put them there, but argued, "We have gone too long in letting people live together in communitaries." Guéant suggests that what has been going on is a state multiculturalism of inaction without specifying how the state could break up existing communities.

A few pages later in the same issue, a columnist analyzed the American "Gallion affair," a case of financial fraud involving financiers from India, as an instance of communialism because these men, who held degrees from Harvard and Wharton and worked at Goldman Sachs and McKinsey, had common national origins. Now, these immigrants did get jobs, great ones. Apparently communialism of one sort is the key to success, albeit illicit success, while communialism of another sort explains high unemployment rates. A cynic might add that if working in small incestuous groups defines communalism, then France, with its unusually small set of industrialists serving on interlocking boards of major companies, its exclusive school system, and marriage practices designed to preserve the elite, is among the most communialist of nations.

In any case France has never undertaken state multiculturalism. Although some officials have deemed the politics of the "right to a difference" that marked several years at the beginning of François Mitterrand's presidency in the 1980s, those politics could hardly be called "multicultural." Some instruction in "languages of origin" was provided, but this was intended to facilitate the eventual "return" of immigrants and their children. Other sources of aid provided tutoring and training, and current policies direct additional money to school districts with large numbers of pupils "in difficulty." At the same time, the French state has provided free language classes to immigrants, assistance to groups seeking to build mosques, and practical accommodations to allow the preparation of halal meat in abattoirs. State support for and control of religious groups, despite the rhetoric of strict state-religion separation, a long-term feature of French policy. More than a century after France's 1905 law of church-state separation, the state pays for the upkeep of older religious buildings, gives tax breaks to religious groups, and hires teachers for private religious schools (most of them Catholic).

BLAMING MULTICULTURALISM for social ills is a Dutch national sport. Yet, as the University of Amsterdam sociologist Jan Willem Duynendijk has written, the Netherlands has never pursued state multiculturalism or the preservation of minority cultures. Instead it has pursued two sets of policies, one aimed at maintaining the long-standing commitment to the political peace, the other at achieving the integration of minorities.

The long-standing Dutch preference for compromise is embodied in the polder model—a reference to working together to build dykes, a bit like Tocqueville's American "harmonizing." Historically this meant that people were loath to criticize mass-simulated immigrants. Dutch cultural practices thereby favored the unofficial continuation of a multicultural social reality, where people were free to continue to speak their own languages, worship in their own ways, and so forth. This kind of "live and let live" social habit was the Dutch solution to religious conflicts during a period of relatively intense religious belief and practice in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It gave
rise to a quasi official model of "pillars": religious networks and institutions within which each Dutch man or woman was presumed to remain.

This social conception of keeping the religious and political peace by separating people according to religious sentiments policies of creating and financing religious schools. Although the pillar structure had come apart before major Muslim immigration was underway in the 1970s and '80s, a psychological residue persisted, dictating that each religious group should ignore the particularities of the other. Far from accepting or recognizing the other's validity, this attitude promoted bare tolerance, civic acceptance of the right to the existence of Catholics, Protestants, and for that matter, gays and pot smokers. Condemnation was constrained to the home or the pulpit. So while Dutch policies and norms favored a diverse society, they took no part of what is today thought of as multiculturalism, with its efforts to reach beyond toleration toward appreciation.

At the same time, governments developed a series of policies aimed at promoting the advancement of minorities through provision of schoolteachers who spoke their languages (principally Arabic and Turkish), construction of local councils that would advise the government on how best to foster integration, and special funding to provide additional tutoring and support at schools heavily attended by the children of immigrants. By the end of the twentieth century these policies had been changed to focus more on skills training and teaching in Dutch, but the goal of state policy continued to be, as it had always been, that of promoting integration. In the Netherlands, as in France, financial aid was targeted to schools with many poor students, who happened to descend from recent immigrants.

The attack on these policies and attitudes has focused on values attributed to Muslims or to Islamic doctrine. In 1991 parliamentary opposition leader Frits Bolkestein criticized the government for failing to defend Western values of free speech and equality against Islamic views. He used the case of Islam to launch a broader attack against the political elite and their way of papering over differences (the polder model) rather than standing up for Enlightenment values against the Islam of the Ayatollahs. A rising class of populist politicians seconded this critique, among them the right-wing and openly gay Pim Fortuyn—killed in 2002 by an activist concerned about scapegoating Muslims—and the anti-Islam campaigners Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders. Their attacks on Islam were
also political appeals against the elites in order to curry favor with the forgotten working classes. Polder politics, elite domination, and Islam were the common enemy, and the refusal of the leading classes to denounce non-Dutch and anti-Enlightenment Islamic values was the major evidence that things had gone wrong. As in France this admonition has been heard on the left and the right, from Social Democrats as well as from Wilders's far right Party for Freedom. It reflects a cultural nationalism that can appeal to the old style populism of the right or to the universalism of the left.

In life and in death, Fortuyn focused the attack on multiculturalism even more narrowly as an attack on Islamic intolerance of sexual diversity, and in particular, of gay lifestyles. Fortuyn personified a secularist, sexually open, and "tolerant" Dutch identity, against which Islam and Muslims could easily be targeted as the pre-Enlightenment other. In another country has the issue of tolerating gays become so central and so salient a part of the critique of Islam. This hue of attack was powerful because it also was a critique of older Dutch ways of doing politics and thinking about sexuality. Throughout most of the twentieth century, most Dutch people held religious views about homosexuality and women's rights that were not too different from those now ascribed to Muslims by their opponents. Attacking Islam was thus also a psychologically useful way of reworking one's own heritage.

Ironically, the current focus on Islam per se—Wilders compared the Qur'\textsuperscript{\textregistered}n to Mein Kampf and seeks to have it banned in the Netherlands—has distracted the far right from policies about minority achievement and language learning. The focus now is on the acceptability in the Enlightenment West of the pre-Enlightenment Muslim. And yet the right continues to attack Dutch multiculturalism because it remains rhetorically useful to link the cultural critique of religion to a populist critique of past elites.

EVENING IN THE COMPANY OF UNDECIDED BIRDS
Cal Bedient

1

we are suspect men birds earth wrists cuffed bent over the hood of evening

what are they asking what have we done?

who can blame the birds (whose hearts are a thousand chemicals) that they hallucinate the rayon day-cover of the moon?

who decides who commands the visions of the beasts?

beloved be the mini-flashlights of their notes turned on too early fading now

birds too clever in the dusk now to sing hardly being with neglected slight wings of the ardent mother of atrocity

birds! she uses two eggs cracks them in the middle

2

would you be the most violet beast listening at the wall of the lectisternium your shallow leek feet curling on the sienna mesa of Melancholia?

are you leaf men rustling in the little republic of breath?

can you oratory a little queen to say I love you at the vanity table of everything? or take a seat yourself before the absent mirror?
there, do you see yourself
Ariel in tights striped spook applying a foundation?
what is that look when you pause just a look?
not bitter in essence as Dido is bitter?
do you too like it black
waved like a limp licorice wand before an orchestra of terror?
eat the scream in your mouth no one will know you ate it,
you punk you dodger of rains children still fling themselves into

3
the huffing accordion commotion of Becoming is a broken idea
there is a boiling together rather an El Greco thigh
or three condors fighting over an elephant
folio or the vapor choked station of St. Lazare
blotting its sentences at this darting juncture

a watch clouded by breath

ah, if the senses could burst the multiplication table
freakishly all-tissued and the concept accept its femme
or would it be heaven just to be AMONG
the least exposed AMONG the most exposed
muffled in an antiquity without period

fields and fields of atoms not saying anything not blowing?

the evening big and small
knows it is to all
that each is called
as one who would be called
hyaline

the rain in the roof of the mouth not zenithal get down and on foot
find your hat or not you are the rain’s
silverheaded cane a luxury

the rain tapping at matter’s root as at a wonder

BLAMING MULTICULTURALISM, then, is useful because it is both vague and misdirected. It would be much harder for Cameron to acknowledge that British racism, immigration trajectories, foreign policy, and faith-based schools have made major contributions toward minority isolation than it is to say: we got it wrong, now let’s get it right, let’s all be British. Islam provides a soft target for aspiring cultural nationalists. It is easier for Sarkozy and Marine Le Pen of the right-wing French National Front to decry Muslims praying in the street than it is to make room for adequate mosques. And across Europe, it is easier to point to the irresponsible statement of a foreign imam and say that Islam is the problem than to figure out how Muslims, like practicing Catholics and Jews before them, might best construct the cultural and religious institutions they need to be at ease in their new (and not so new) countries.

One can, and should, refute these misdiagnoses and at the same time give due credit to policies promoting integration within each of these societies. Speaking the language of the country and gaining job skills are the keys to becoming a productive citizen. France made free French courses part of its “integration contract” in 2003; with its 2005 Immigration Act, Germany began providing free German lessons to people granted work visas. When most Islamic religious officials are recent immigrants, it makes good sense to offer them instruction in the language, law, and politics of their new country of residence. These are policies of integration rather than assimilation; they are perfectly consistent with the promotion of equal respect for all religions and cultures.

Blaming multiculturalism ties the package together: it discards a foreign element Islam and it identifies the fifth column that let it in, those past proponents of multiculturalism. That it misreads history is beside the point. It makes for effective, albeit irresponsible, populist politics.
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