April 26, 17

General Studies Council

The School of Politics and Global Studies supports the application of the Historical Awarenss designation to HST/POS 112.

Thank you,

Richard Herrera
Associate Director,
School of Politics and Global Studies

GENERAL STUDIES COURSE PROPOSAL COVER FORM

Course information:

Copy and paste current course information from Class Search/Course Catalog.

College/School	College of Liberal Arts and Sciences	Department/School	**History/SHPRS**

Prefix:	**HST**	Number:	**112**	Title:	Foundations of Democracy	Units:	3

Course description: Introduces an interdisciplinary study of democracy with special attention to its historical development as a form of government.

Is this a cross-listed course?	Yes	If yes, please identify course(s):	**POS 112**

Is this a shared course?	No	If so, list all academic units offering this course:	

*Note- For courses that are crosslisted and/or shared, a letter of support from the chair/director of **each** department that offers the course is required for **each** designation requested. By submitting this letter of support, the chair/director agrees to ensure that all faculty teaching the course are aware of the General Studies designation(s) and will teach the course in a manner that meets the criteria for each approved designation.*

Is this a permanent-numbered course with topics?   No

If yes, all topics under this permanent-numbered course must be taught in a manner that meets the criteria for the approved designation(s). It is the responsibility of the chair/director to ensure that all faculty teaching the course are aware of the General Studies designation(s) and adhere to the above guidelines.

Chair/Director Initials

_____ (Required)

Requested designation: Historical Awareness–H   **Mandatory Review: No**

*Note- a **separate** proposal is required for each designation.*

Eligibility: Permanent numbered courses **must** have completed the university's review and approval process. For the rules governing approval of omnibus courses, contact Phyllis.Lucie@asu.edu.

Submission deadlines dates are as follow:

     For Fall 2018 Effective Date: October 1, 2017   For Spring 2019 Effective Date: March 10, 2018

Area(s) proposed course will serve:

A single course may be proposed for more than one core or awareness area. A course may satisfy a core area requirement and more than one awareness area requirements concurrently, but may not satisfy requirements in two core areas simultaneously, even if approved for those areas. With departmental consent, an approved General Studies course may be counted toward both the General Studies requirement and the major program of study.

Checklists for general studies designations:

Complete and attach the appropriate checklist

     Literacy and Critical Inquiry core courses (L)
     Mathematics core courses (MA)
     Computer/statistics/quantitative applications core courses (CS)
     Humanities, Arts and Design core courses (HU)
     Social-Behavioral Sciences core courses (SB)
     Natural Sciences core courses (SQ/SG)
     Cultural Diversity in the United States courses (C)
     Global Awareness courses (G)
     Historical Awareness courses (H)

A complete proposal should include:

- ☐ Signed course proposal cover form
- ☒ Criteria checklist for General Studies designation being requested
- ☒ Course catalog description
- ☒ Sample syllabus for the course
- ☒ Copy of table of contents from the textbook and list of required readings/books

It is respectfully requested that proposals are submitted electronically with all files compiled into one PDF.

Contact information:

Name	Leslie Hughes	E-mail	leslie.k.hughes@asu.edu	Phone	480.727.0689

Department Chair/Director approval: *(Required)*

Chair/Director name (Typed):	Matthew Garcia	Date:	4/26/17

Chair/Director (Signature): _____

HISTORICAL AWARENESS [H]

Rationale and Objectives

Recent trends in higher education have called for the creation and development of historical consciousness in undergraduates now and in the future. History studies the growth and development of human society from a number of perspectives such as—political, social, economic and/or cultural. From one perspective, historical awareness is a valuable aid in the analysis of present-day problems because historical forces and traditions have created modern life and lie just beneath its surface. From a second perspective, the historical past is an indispensable source of identity and of values, which facilitate social harmony and cooperative effort. Along with this observation, it should be noted that historical study can produce intercultural understanding by tracing cultural differences to their origins in the past. A third perspective on the need for historical awareness is that knowledge of history helps us to learn from the past to make better, more well-informed decisions in the present and the future.

The requirement of a course that is historical in method and content presumes that "history" designates a sequence of past events or a narrative whose intent or effect is to represent both the relationship between events and change over time. The requirement also presumes that these are human events and that history includes all that has been felt, thought, imagined, said, and done by human beings. The opportunities for nurturing historical consciousness are nearly unlimited. History is present in the languages, art, music, literatures, philosophy, religion, and the natural sciences, as well as in the social science traditionally called History.

The justifications for how the course fits each of the criteria need to be clear both in the application tables and the course materials. The Historical Awareness designation requires consistent analysis of the broader historical context of past events and persons, of cause and effect, and of change over time. Providing intermittent, anecdotal historical context of people and events usually will not suffice to meet the Historical Awareness criteria. A Historical Awareness course will instead embed systematic historical analysis in the core of the syllabus, including readings and assignments. For courses focusing on the history of a field of study, the applicant needs to show both how the field of study is affected by political, social, economic, and/or cultural conditions AND how political, social, economic, and/or cultural conditions are affected by the field of study.

Revised October 2015

Proposer: Please complete the following section and attach appropriate documentation.

		ASU--[H] CRITERIA	
		THE HISTORICAL AWARENESS [H] COURSE MUST MEET THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:	
YES	**NO**		**Identify Documentation Submitted**
☒	☐	**1.** History is a major focus of the course.	
☒	☐	**2.** The course examines and explains human development as a sequence of events influenced by a variety of factors.	
☒	☐	**3.** There is a disciplined systematic examination of human institutions as they change over time.	
☒	☐	**4.** The course examines the relationship among events, ideas, and artifacts and the broad social, political and economic context.	
		THE FOLLOWING ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE:	
		• **Courses that are merely organized chronologically.**	
		• **Courses which are exclusively the history of a field of study or of a field of artistic or professional endeavor.**	
		• **Courses whose subject areas merely occurred in the past.**	

Course Prefix	Number	Title	General Studies Designation
Hst/Pos	112	Foundations of Democracy	

Explain in detail which student activities correspond to the specific designation criteria.
Please use the following organizer to explain how the criteria are being met.

Criteria (from checksheet)	How course meets spirit (contextualize specific examples in next column)	Please provide detailed evidence of how course meets criteria (i.e., where in syllabus)
1	This course explores the history of ideas, specifically related to the foundations of democracy from ancient Athenians to the present	See the entire syllabus, p.1-2, as well as readings in syllabus. p.6' and document called Readings.
2	The course includes weekly lectures which explore the context for the Debates and the Readings. Lectures include ancient Greece, early modern Europe, the English revolution, the French revolution, American constitutional founding; the debate over slavery;	See entire Syllabus, p. 1-2; Documents called Lectures and Readings.
3	This course explores systematically the development of democratic and republican thought through debates, lectures, and examinations.	See Syllabus, p1-2; Document called Lectures.
4	Examinations in the Midterm and the Final require students to think and write systematically.	See Syllabus under Midterm and Exams, , p.2; as well as attached Midterm and Final Exam, p. 1.

HST 112 Foundations of Democracy

Course Description

"Foundations of Democracy" introduces students to the history of thinking about democracy – by both its proponents and its critics. The course is required for the undergraduate certificate Program in Political Thought and Leadership, but is open to all students. Its content is organized around a series of debates over the fundamental issues posed by democracy: students will be invited to present oral arguments, pro and con, in response to assigned topics. Lectures by your instructors will serve to place these debate topics in their proper historical contexts. Regular attendance in class and keeping up with the assigned readings (supplied via the Blackboard page) are essential to success in the class. In addition to participation in debates, and serving as "respondents" in discussion of our readings, students will be required to write a take-home mid-term and a take-home final exam.

- **ASU – Fall 2016**

HST & POS 112: FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

(LEC 84129 & 79108; Tuesday-Thursday, 1:30-2:45; PEBW 140)

Instructors

Professor Donald Critchlow (Office: Coor 4578; phone: 480-965-5778; email: dcritchl@asu.edu)

Professor Kent Wright (Office: Coor 4462; phone: 480-965-8595; email: johnson.wright@asu.edu)

Course Description

HST 112: "Foundations of Democracy" introduces students to the history of thinking about democracy – by both its proponents and its critics. The course is required for the undergraduate certificate Program in Political Thought and Leadership, but is open to all students. Its content is organized around a series of debates over the fundamental issues posed by democracy: students will be invited to present oral arguments, pro and con, in response to assigned topics. Lectures by your instructors will serve to place these debate topics in their proper historical contexts. Regular attendance in class and keeping up with the assigned readings (supplied via the Blackboard page) are essential to success in the class. In addition to participation in debates, and serving as "respondents" in discussion of our readings, students will be required to write a take-home mid-term and a take-home final exam.

Student Learning Objectives

Upon successful completion of the course, students will have acquired:

    1. An understanding of the history of democracy as a form of government;

    2. A grasp of the range of philosophical arguments for and against democracy, as they have developed over time, in specific historical contexts;

    3. The ability to speak and write well on the subject of democracy and its history.

Requirements and Grading

Students' performance in the course will be assessed according to a 400-point scale (360-400=A; 320-359=B; 280-319=C; etc.):
1. Attendance and Participation   50 points
2. Discussion of Readings   50 points
3 Debate   100 points
4. Mid-Term Paper   100 points
5. Final Paper   100 points

Debates, Readings, Exams

Debates. Students will be organized, randomly, into 16 teams (typically of three, never fewer than two), each of which will debate *once* in the course of the semester – arguing on behalf of, or against, a series of propositions or resolutions, all having to do with our readings (e.g.: "When it comes to leadership, in politics or in private life, Machiavelli had it exactly right"). You will be encouraged to work with the instructors in developing arguments and strategies for the debates. Your performance in your debate will be evaluated on the basis of two factors: the debate itself (50 points), and a short essay, due by the following class meeting in which you are required to argue on behalf of the *opposite* side of whatever position you took in the debate (50 points).

Readings. Each team will also be required to serve *once* as formal "respondents" to questions posed by the instructors, having to do with analysis of assigned readings (note - a *different* set of readings from those each team debates). Our prompts will give you an idea of what kinds of questions will encounter; your responses will be graded on a 50-point scale.

Mid-Term and Final Papers. You are on you own, however, for these papers, both in take-home format: we will supply you with topics or "prompts," and you will return your essay – no more than 1000 words, double-spaced - to us via the Blackboard site. The exams will be graded on the persuasiveness and organization of your arguments, as well as on the quality and style of your writing.

Attendance and Participation, Class Behavior, and Academic Integrity

Attendance at all class meetings is required; late arrival and early departure are strongly discouraged; please notify the instructors in advance, should it be necessary to miss all or part of a class meeting. Participation in classroom discussion is an important component of the course (and will be graded, with attendance, on a 50-point scale): the free expression of ideas depends on a maximum of courtesy and respect for others. Students are responsible for knowing and adhering to the ASU Student Academic Integrity Policy (see provost.asu.edu/academicintegrity); violations - which include, but are not limited to plagiarism, cheating on examinations, submitting work from other courses - will be sanctioned in accordance with ASU guidelines.

Students with Disabilities
We are eager to make accommodations for instruction and testing for students with disabilities; please consult with the instructors and with the ASU Disabilities Resource Services.

Required Readings

With only a few exceptions (e.g., Machiavelli's *The Prince* – easily found on the Internet, though students may also purchase any edition) the required readings for the course, listed in detail in the schedule below, will be made available directly to students via the course Blackboard site.

Schedule

(Class meetings are of three kinds: *lectures* by your instructors; *readings*, which you are expected to complete *prior* to class, of course - and not just the teams serving as "respondents"; and *debates*. The schedule is subject to change at the discretion of the instructors. Dates for holidays and deadlines for class assignments are marked in **bold**)

WEEK 1
   Thurs 18 Aug - Introduction to the course

WEEK 2
   Tues 23 Aug - Lecture: "Democracy in Classical Greece – and Beyond"
   Thurs 25 Aug - Reading 1: selections from *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Teams 5 & 12)

WEEK 3
   Tues 30 Aug - Debate 1: the Athenians vs. the Melians (Team 1 vs. Team 16)
   Thurs 1 Sept - Lecture: "From Classical Antiquity to the Renaissance"

WEEK 4
   Tues 6 Sept - Reading 2: *The Prince*; selection from *Discourses on Livy* (Teams 8 & 9)
   Thurs 8 Sept - Debate 2: Machiavelli, For and Against (Team 2 vs. Team 15)

WEEK 5
   Tues 13 Sept - Lecture: "English Revolutions, European Enlightenment"
   Thurs 15 Sept - Reading 3: selections from Locke and Hume (Teams 7 & 10)

WEEK 6
   Tues 20 Sept - Debate 3: Locke vs. Hume (Team 3 vs. Team 14)
   Thurs 22 Sept - Lecture: "Enlightenment and Progress"

WEEK 7
   Tues 27 Sept - Reading 4: selections from Rousseau, etc. (Teams 6 & 11)
   Thurs 29 Sept - Debate 4: Rousseau vs. Everybody Else (Team 4 vs. Team 13)

WEEK 8
   Tues 4 Oct - Lecture: "Democracy and Revolution"
   Thurs 6 Oct - Reading 5: selections from Burke and Paine (Teams 1 & 16)
   Fri 7 Oct - **Mid-Term Paper due**

WEEK 9
    Tues 11 Oct - **Fall Break**
    Thurs 13 Oct - Debate 5: Burke vs. Paine (Team 5 vs. Team 12)

WEEK 10
    Tues 18 Oct - Lecture: "The US Constitution"
    Thurs 20 Oct - Reading 6: selections from *The Federalist* and Anti-Federalists (Teams 2 & 15)

WEEK 11
    Tues 25 Oct - Debate 6: Federalists vs. Anti-Federalists (Team 6 vs. Team 11)
    Thurs 27 Oct - Lecture: "Tocqueville and Democracy"

WEEK 12
    Tues 1 Nov - Reading 7: selections from *Democracy in America* (Teams 3 & 14)
    Thurs 3 Nov - Debate 7: Tocqueville on "Soft Despotism" (Team 7 vs. Team 10)

 WEEK 13
    Tues 8 Nov - Lecture: "The American Civil War"
    Thurs 10 Nov - Reading 8: excerpts from the Lincoln-Douglas debates (Teams 4 & 13)

WEEK 14
    Tues 15 Nov - Debate 8: Lincoln vs. Douglas (Team 8 vs. Team 9)
    Thurs 17 - Lecture: "Democratic Education"

WEEK 15
    Tues 22 Nov - Reading 9: selections by Robert Maynard Hutchins, Michael M. Crow
    Thurs 24 Nov - **No class meeting - Thanksgiving**

WEEK 16
    Tues 29 Nov - Debate 9: Hutchins vs. Crow (entire class participates - mêlée ensues)
    Thurs 1 Dec - Summing Up, Final Papers

WEEK 17
    Tues 6 Dec - **Final Paper due**

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HST 112 - 2016
Teams and Debates

Here are some specifics on our debates. We have sorted you, arbitrarily, into 16 groups (all but three of which have three members - news students will join one of the groups that currently have only two): (1) Jacob Emmett, Matthew Hayhurst, Scott Warren; (2) jAlexander Alonzo, Benjamin Bisgrove; (3) Jonathan Arroyo, Jamie Kuehner, Avery Tomasi; (4) John Hymes, Timothy Rooney, Anthony Trujillo; (5) jRoberta Julianne Golez, Charles Kennedy, Zetong Wang; (6) Nicole Courtney, Andrew Ryan, Blaise Wentz; (7) Matthew Beeks, Miho Sakuma, Sheridan Smede; (8) Mallory Hayhurst, Michel Shannon; (9) Anthony Bonfiglio, Benjamin Metzger; (10) Mohammad Ababtain, Reid Edwards, Katrina Mclaughlin; (11) Parker Dippel, Andrew Murphy, Julio Partido; (12) Robert Bartlemay, Trina Jhunjhnuwala, Jayleen Mato; (13) Maahind Gajera, Julian Thier, Nathaniel Tilden; (14) Natalie

Miller, Chiu Tung Pun, Lance Siegel; (15) Faisal Aldowaish, Jason Hald, Dallis Meiering; (16) Jacob Black, Paul Morrison, Brian Valencia Arvizu). Each team will participate in *one* debate in the course of the semester.

The format for the debates will be a simplified version of what is known as the "Australian-Asian" style of debate. You'll have before you a resolution – e.g., "Resolved, that dogs are better than cats" – in favor of which the affirmative team argues ("Dogs *are*, indeed, better than cats, and here's why"), and negative team against ("No, dogs are *not* better than cats" or, if you like, "No, *cats* are better than dogs, and here's why"). A member of the Affirmative team speaks first, making a case; a member of the Negative team replies – and so on. It is up to each team to decide in advance the *order* in which they speak, and, roughly speaking, what they intend to say – though, the fact of having to *reply* to previous speakers will make improvisation necessary. In any case, each speech will be confined to a maximum of five minutes – we'll use a timer, issue a warning at four minutes, and cut off the speaker at four. The debate over, we then turn to cross-examination: first, each team will have the opportunity to pose questions to the opposing team; then the instructors and the audience will have the same opportunity. Questions and replies will be strictly limited to two minutes each.

The debate is over – but your work is not quite. Before the start of the following class meeting, each debater will turn in a brief essay (500 words maximum), in which they make a case for the *opposite* side of whatever position the occupied in the debate. As for grading, each debater will be graded on both their oral performance in the debate (50 points – for "Matter, Manner, and Method"), and for the quality of their essay, arguing the other side (50 points). In any case, every team will have to a do a bit of planning and preparation beforehand (we'll designate the teams as "Groups" on Blackboard for the purpose) – deciding exactly how to make your case, with what arguments and what evidence; choosing the order of the speakers; and trying anticipate what the other side might say. We will give you all the help and advice we can, in our lectures and discussion of the texts in class, and in office hours, if you like. But the topics are very open-ended and you should feel free to approach them with imagination and verve – though keeping in mind that one of your aims is to demonstrate your knowledge of the texts at hand.

Here, in any case, is the schedule for the debates, with teams and topics:

Debate 1 (30 August): *"Resolved, that when it comes to justice, the Athenians were right, the Melians were wrong"*
　　Affirmative: Team 1; Negative: Team 16.

Debate 2 (8 September): *"Resolved, that when it comes to leadership, in any field – business, politics, you name it – Machiavelli's Prince is the perfect manual"*
　　Affirmative: Team 2; Negative: Team 15.

Debate 3 (20 September): *"Resolved, that when it comes to a revolution and the "original contract" Locke was right and Hume was wrong."*
　　Affirmative: Team 3; Negative: Team 14.

Debate 4 (29 September): *"Resolved, that when it comes to progress and civilization, Rousseau was right and everybody else was wrong."*
　　Affirmative: Team 4; Negative: Team 13.

Debate 5 (13 October): *"Resolved, that when it comes to revolution, Burke was right, Paine was wrong.*
　　Affirmative: Team 5; Negative: Team 12.

Debate 6 (26 October): "*Resolved, that when it come to the US Constitution, the Antifederalists were right, the Federalists wrong"*
　　Affirmative: Team 6; Negative: Team 11.

Debate 7 (3 November): *"Resolved, that the United States today has indeed fallen prey to "soft despotism" in the Tocquevillean sense of the term"*
    Affirmative: Team 7; Negative: Team 10

Debate 8 (15 November): *"Resolved, that when it comes to democracy, Douglas was right, Lincoln was wrong"*
    Affirmative: Team 8; Negative: Team 9.

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↕ Teams and Readings
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HST 112 - 2016

In addition to participating in one debate in the course of the semester, each team will serve once as "respondents" to questions from the instructors in regard to the readings - different readings, we hasten to add, from those on which each team debates. The questions will be *primarily* expository, aimed at generating a collective consensus about what the texts actually say and mean. For each set of readings, we will circulate in advance at least six questions about the texts, to serve as starting points for discussion. The "respondents," from each team, should be prepared with answers to any and all of the questions - as should the rest of the class, however, since the instructors will be following up their initial questions with further queries. The respondents' answers will be graded on a 50-point scale; the rest of the class will earn participation points for their contribution to the discussion. Here, in any case, is an initial set of questions, for Thursday's discussion of the selections from Thucydides.

Readings 1 (8/25): Thucydides
    (1) Who was Thucydides and why did he write his *History* in the first place? How would you describe his "historical method" - bearing in mind that he is one of the two founding fathers of historical writing in the West? What do you make of the contrast he draws between "history" and "myth"? What about those speeches?
    (2) At the start of the "Funeral Oration" ascribed to Pericles, the latter suggests that the Athenians' ancestors bestowed two great gifts on them - what are these? How should we conceive of the relation between the two?
    (3) Then there is "democracy" - how is that characterized in the "Funeral Oration"? What is "Pericles's" attitude toward poverty? Individual freedoms? Women?
    (4) Never mind "Pericles" - what about Thucydides himself? What light does his characterization of Pericles shed on his own attitude toward democracy? What about his description of the civil war in Corcyra?
    (5) Finally, the famous "Melian Dialogue": how does Thucydides set this up? Any speculation about what Thucydides was up to with this section, unique to the text?
    (6) As for specifics, the Melians offer a whole string of arguments against what the Athenians are doing - they are behaving unjustly, irrationally, dishonorably, they are violating divine wishes, they will be abandoned by their allies, etc., etc. How do the Athenians respond to each objection? If you got to choose sides in our re-staging of the debate, which would you choose?

 Readings 2 (9/6): Machiavelli (Teams 8 and 9)

Here are six starter-questions about Machiavelli to ponder - especially pertinent to Teams 8 and 9, our "respondents," but fair game for everyone who can get a word in edgewise:

1. Early on in *The Prince*, Machiavelli says that his primary topic will *not* be hereditary principalities, but *new* ones. How does he justify the choice? Can you think of any other reasons he might have for concentrating on "new" principalities? What kind of distinction does he draw between France and Turkey - both hereditary principalities?

2. In regard to "new" principalities, Machiavelli draws a sharp distinction between those acquired by "fortune" and those acquired by "virtue." What does he mean, in particular, by the latter?

3. But when he gets to the subject of how a prince should rule, beginning with Chapter 15, Machiavelli says that princes should learn now *not* to be "virtuous" - what on earth does this mean? Why was it so scandalous - because he said so, or because it is true?

4. In Chapter 25, Machiavelli returns to "fortune," introducing a simile "fortune is like a river") and a metaphor ("fortune is a woman") for understanding it. How should we interpret these? Insightful, appalling, disgusting, discrepant? Does Chapter 26 shed any light on the problems here?

5. Turning to our handful of chapters from the *Discourses on Livy,* do you see any deep discrepancy or contradiction between the *Prince* and the *Discourses*? Could they have been written by the same person? How should we see them as fitting together?

6. On what grounds does Machiavelli believe that "the masses" or "the people" are "wiser and more constant than a Prince"? Is there any sense in which we might say that Machiavelli is a bit of a "democrat"? If so, forget about Machiavelli - what does that tell us about "democracy?"

Lecture Notes 8/23

Beginnings are always tough, and the story of "democracy" is as difficult as any other. As we mentioned the other day, democracy is universal today – the name for political legitimacy around the world, as thoroughly at home in India and Brazil as it is in the U.S. or France. But it wasn't always so: today's global phenomenon had a very particular birth, as word and idea, in a tiny corner of the ancient world, and that's where are starting. Our story will go by pretty quickly, since we have to cram two thousand years of complicated history into fifteen or sixteen weeks. If you'd like a somewhat more extended historical introduction to the topic, you can't do any better than a still-slender book called *Democracy: A History* (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005), by the English political philosopher John Dunn – by far the most searching and thoughtful recent attempt to grasp this history as a whole. As Dunn makes clear, the word "democracy" – *demokratia* – was first introduced by Greek thinkers to describe a particular form of *polis* or "city-state." Not a lot of evidence about how the word was used has survived, and the bulk of it has to do with one *polis* in particular, Athens, and even here, all we have to go on is not much more than a few pages of texts by a tiny handful of thinkers.

(A) The Emergence of the Classical Greek Polis

(1) All we have time for is to recall, first, what historians tell us about classical Greek city-states in general. They first appear in historical records, c. 800 BCE, at the end of a long "dark age," together with the reappearance, after a lapse, of coinage; with the Greek adaptation of the Phoenician alphabet for writing; and with the launching of the phenomenon of "colonization," which, by 600 or so had scattered some 1500 city-states or *poleis* all around the Mediterranean. As for political development, the standard story you hear for almost all city-states is of their evolution from a form of *monarchy* to some form of *aristocratic* domination; and from there, in some cases, usually via a brief episode of temporary "*tyranny*," to *democracy*. In any case, here are a few touchstones in the history of the classical *polis*.

(2) The famous city state of **Sparta** was evidently the first to acquire a durable shape: this depended on the arrival of a new kind of infantry warfare (*hoplites*), as well as the capture of a subject labor force (the *helots*); the Spartan constitution, according to legend, was established by the lawgiver Lycurgus around 650, and later gave rise to a potent egalitarian myth. But was Sparta a "democracy"? Not according to the way the term was used.

(3) The **Persian Wars** (499-479) – here was the successful defense of the Greek peninsula against Persian attack – ancient Persia being one of the long series of imperial states that dominated ancient Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau. The wars started with a Greek revolt in Ionia (west coast of Turkey, today), 499-94, which led to two successive invasions by Persia, in 490 and 480-79, whose defeat is often seen as a great turning point in the crystallization of idea of a free "west."

(4) And the Persian Wars led to what we still call the **classical era** (479-322), of Greek freedom, which ended with the absorption of the Greek city-states into the empire of Alexander the Great of Macedonia. The paradox of classical Greek civilization was to produce an apparently *urban* culture of great brilliance, in what was still a thoroughly *agrarian* world; and among its preconditions were *geographic* fortune (the unique setting of the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean in general), and *socio-economic* innovation – chattel slavery on an unprecedented scale. However the trick was done, it was rare in world history – a real exception to the general run of pre-modern agrarian states, dominated, as they almost invariably were, by various combinations of marauders and monks.

(B) Classical Athens: Radical Democracy and Abortive Imperialism

(1) The story of the evolution of **Athenian democracy** (600-500 is largely told through successive "lawgivers" (Solon, c. 600) or "tyrants" (Peisistratos, 561, 556), and then politicians, Cleisthenes (c. 500) above all. The result was the "democracy" of the classical period, which featured rule by means of the *ekklesia* or large assembly, which all 30,000 or so citizens could attend, and which met very frequently, and from which a smaller council or *boule*, with 500 members, chosen by lot ("sortition") from 139 or so territorial units, and which typically met daily, and from which a tenth, selected by lot, too, acted as a kind of executive body, headed by magistrates selected by lot, for 24-hour periods. As described Aristotle and others, this can all seem somewhat insanely complicated. But there's no doubt about a couple of striking features of direct democracy Athenian-style - the preference throughout for sortition, rather than election; and the principle of (small) payment for participation.

(2) Meanwhile, the leading Athenian role in the Persian Wars had led to the first of the three most important attempts in classical antiquity to use the city-state as a springboard for imperial adventure. The "**Athenian Empire**" (c. 479 onwards) was the least impressive and most fleeting of these. It was essentially a naval protection-racket, in which Athens siphoned off wealth from a series of - mostly "democratic," too - allies, in return for defense against Persians and other enemies. Reaching its peak during the period when Athens was dominated by the politician Pericles (c. 495-429), the empire eventually provoked a revolt by other Greek city-states, led by Sparta: the **Peloponnesian Wars** began with a Spartan invasion of Attica; impasse followed, with the declaration of a truce, the "Peace of Nikias," in 421; the war resumed with a disastrous Athenian expedition against Sicily (415-13); with Persian help, the Spartans conquered and occupied Athens in 404. Post-imperial Athens? The war lost, a brief period of oligarchic rule was followed by the restoration of the democracy and a settling of accounts; but Sparta and Thebes dominated larger Greek political affairs throughout the fourth century.

(C) Selections from Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War*

(1) *Introductory – pp. 1, 12*-13. And so we arrive at the first of our texts, excerpts from Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Thucydides, you'll recall, was the second of two "founding fathers" of historical writing in the West – after Herodotus, historian of the Persian Wars, and much else besides – but first in the hearts of most later historians and political thinkers. He was in fact not just an Athenian, but an Athenian general, who, after he showed up late for a naval battle, was banished for some twenty years – happily for us, since it gave him the leisure to write the *History*. One of the most famous features of the work, in addition to the icy severity of its analysis of human (mis)behavior, are the numerous "set speeches" that Thucydides throws into the mouths of various actors in his drama: "What particular people said in their speeches, either just before or during the war, was hard to recall exactly, whether they were speeches I heard myself or those that were reported to me at second hand. I have made each speaker say what I thought the situation demanded, keeping as near as possible to the general sense of what was actually said."

(2) *The "Funeral Oration of Pericles," pp. 39-46*. So we're dealing here with bit of tricky ventriloquism on the part of Thucyidides – especially went it comes to the most famous of the set-speeches, the "funeral oration" that he attributes to the great democratic politician Pericles, after the first battles of the war. And here you have the classically approbative self-description of Athenian "democracy," as a model for the rest of the Greeks in how to live well. Or is it? How many cheers do you really think "Pericles" – that is, Thucydides – is giving for "democracy" here? Three? Two? Only one, perhaps? There's actually a lot of debate about this. Let's add, too, what happens next, which is always important in Thucydides. Immediately following the "Funeral Oration" comes his description of the horrifying plague that descended on Athens, decimating its population and carrying away Pericles himself. Thucydides gives a blood-curdling description of the symptoms of the plague, and then adds: "I know all this because I suffered from it myself."

(3) *The Civil War in Corcyra, pp. 89-95*. We've thrown in this miserable little tale for obvious reasons – here you've got another view of what "democracy" was all about, on the ground; and you get a pretty vivid sense of Thucydides's own understanding of "human nature" – a notion central to political thought, Western and otherwise.

(4) *The Melian Dialogue, pp. 102-109.* And here is the star of our show – not a set-piece speech, but something unique to the text. As we head into our debate, it's worth paying close attention to the way that Thucydides sets things up – Melos, as a Spartan ally, was an oligarchy, and the Athenians were not permitted to appeal to the "demos" of Melos – but then the Melian representatives have thoughts of their own on that subject. In any case, the substance of the debate is pretty straightforward – at stake, one by one, are justice, self-interest, divine favor, the support of allies, and honor. The trick, for Teams 1 and 16, will be in trying to convince the rest of us who was on the right path here – the "democrats" of Athens, or their Melian opponents . . .

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↕ **9/1: From Classical Antiquity to the Renaissance**

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HST-POS 112

Class Notes (9/1) - Classical Antiquity to the Renaissance

Welcome to a super-edition of "Class Notes," which will take us all the way from Thucydides to Machiavelli, in one fell swoop. Speaking of Machiavelli, there are actually *two* readings from his hand. One, no doubt already familiar to many of you, is *The Prince*, which you can find online with ease - in fact, if you go to the Wikipedia article on *The Prince* (which is itself excellent, as Wiki articles go), and scroll down to "External links" at the end, you've find a handful of different editions right there. It's a pretty short text and there's no harm in reading all of it. But what we'll concentrate on are Chapters 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 12-26. The other reading is a selection of chapters from Machiavelli's other major work, the *Discourses on Livy* - and those you'll find in a PDF among our "Readings" on the Blackboard site.

From the Classical Mediterranean to Medieval Europe and Beyond

This lecturette has to serve as a bridge, taking us all the way from Classical Athens to the Florence of Machiavelli - a long, strange trip, of course. "Democracy" came into the world as the name for a specific kind of Greek *polis* or "citizen state." We've already hinted at the ulterior fate of these. All of the Greek *poleis*, "democratic" or "oligarchic," were swept up into the Macedonian Empire of Philip Ii of Macedonia and his son, Alexander - whose lightning conquest of Persia constituted the second great experiment in ancient Mediterranean imperialism, flinging Greek-style cities all over the ancient Near East. Many of these cities were indeed *poleis* - but the states that ruled over them, successors to Alexander's short-lived empire, were all monarchies of one kind of another. Eventually, of course, the Greek city-states themselves were absorbed into the Roman Empire, the third and infinitely more successful attempt to build an empire on city-state foundations. Although the Roman ruling class eventually became bi-cultural thereby, appropriating classical Greek culture for their own purposes, they used a Latin term to describe Rome - it was their "republic," they sometimes said, launching the long career of that term. Was it a "democracy," too, in any sense? Hold that thought for a moment - we'll return to it. As for the Roman *empire*, that took centuries to assemble, as the Republic expanded in circular direction: Rome first conquered the bulk of the Italian peninsula; by the end of the third century BCE, it had defeated rivals for control of the Western Mediterranean - the north African state of Carthage, above all - which then brought control over huge inland territories - Spain and Southern Gaul: With the West secure, the Romans turned eastwards: by the end of the next century, they had brought most of the eastern Mediterranean under their control as well - Greece, Palestine, even Egypt, soon enough.

Now, these centuries of conquest had brought great wealth to Rome - land, money, hundreds of thousands of slaves. But they always put terrific pressure on the Republic itself - governing and policing so vast an empire involved all kinds of stresses and strains. These erupted into an epic series of civil wars in the course of the first century, fought between Roman generals who now possessed vast private armies of their own. The "Roman Revolution," as a famous study called it, did not actually destroy or replace the Republic - what it did was put the Republic under the superintendence of a military-based imperial structure above it. Roman "emperors" were not hereditary kings, a word the Romans could never bring themselves to use - they used all kinds of euphemisms, including *"princeps*," early on, and "Caesar" and "Augustus" later; and in any case, Roman civil law continued to sustain the stable underpinnings of Roma society. The *Pax Romana* was hugely successful: for something close to another half-millennium, this political and social structure maintained and reproduced itself. There were ups and downs, as imperial "houses" (emperors tended to name their successors, so there were some "dynasties") rotated around the Mediterranean: the empire nearly collapsed at the end of the third century CE, and saved itself partly by dividing administratively into Western and

Eastern halves, Latin and Greek, ruled from Rome and Constantinople. And in the century after that, there was a tremendous ideological shift, as official paganism gave way to official Christianity.

But all good things come to an end, and by 500 CE the Roman Empire in the West had disappeared, falling victim to internal decay and then to dismemberment by German-speaking "barbarians" from the north, who were followed into Europe, in due course, by their Slavic brethren. The Eastern Roman Empire survived for another thousand years, but as an increasingly shrunken ghost of its former self, having lost much of its control over the eastern and southern Mediterranean to the Arab conquests, which began with the arrival Islam in the seventh century. As for the west, you know what happened next - something completely different, it might be said. The fall of the western Empire was catastrophic - population dropped, cities largely disappeared, all the indeces of culture and prosperity went into reverse, thanks not least to the continual pounding of invaders from the north ("Vikings") and wave after wave from Central Asia in the east, from Avars and Bulgars to the Mongols themselves in the 13th century. Meanwhile, however, out of a re-mixing of classical, Germanic, and Slavic foundations, a new "European" civilization gradually assembled itself. By 1000 or so, the West and Center of Europe had a produced a new "feudal" social system, based on serf-agriculture, with landed nobilities formed around frail monarchical micro-states. Over the next 300 years, "feudal" society was dynamic enough to preside over a doubling of European population, and dramatic expansion outward - to the northeast, into the Baltic and Slave east; then the re-conquest of the Iberian Peninsula; and the - temporary, of course - conquest of the Eastern Mediterranean (the "Crusades"). It didn't last - the "Middle Ages" ended in an over-determined "crisis" after 1350 or so, when feudal social relations ran into some internal limits, just as the Mongol invasions coincided with the arrival of the Black Death - a century of internal civil strife and warfare followed, from which Europe emerged into the blazing sun of the Renaissance and then the emancipating storms of the Reformation, with Scientific Revolution, Enlightenment, then "democratic" Revolutions, coming into sight, just over the horizon . . .

Wait a minute, hold your horses. Let's go back and talk about "democracy" a bit more. Did it *really* just disappear, between Classical Athens and, say, the English, or American, or French Revolutions? Starting with the Romans, let's point out that the most famous Greek analyst of the rise of the Roman Empire found a striking use for the term. The great historian Polybius, writing in the second century, in the wake of Roman victory in the Punic Wars, attributed this success to the fact that the Republic had a "mixed" constitution, blending "democratic" (Rome's popular assemblies), "aristocratic" (the Senate), and "monarchical" components (the two annually-elected Consuls). The idea of "mixed government" was destined to have a long life ahead of it. Indeed, wherever the ghost of the Roman Empire continued to stalk the earth, the idea of "mixed government" wasn't far away - exhibit #1 being the Roman Catholic Church itself, with its complicated machinery of Church councils, assemblies of bishops and cardinals,

and (semi-elective) papacy. Meanwhile, all of you fans of "Gothic" liberty, eager to trace some part of the impulse behind modern democracy to the Germanic contribution to European civilization, will be ready to remind us that that feudal monarchy never went without some variety of warrior assembly, giving advice and consent to kings - embodied in all those "estates," and "parliaments," "cortes," etc., etc., that littered the medieval political scenery. Surely some part of the lineage of modern democracy can be traced back to these representative institutions, perhaps even the idea of "representative democracy" itself . . .

The Renaissance

Well, maybe. In any case, let's talk about the Renaissance. Everybody already has some notion of what it was all about - the effort, on the part of 14th- and 15th-century Italians (in the first instance, though the fad spread northwards - Montaigne, Shakespeare), to imitate the culture of classical antiquity: to paint, sculpt, design buildings, write, *think* like the ancient Greeks and Romans. Let's add to that, though, a few related specifications, less conventionally associated with the Renaissance, at least from an "art history" standpoint. (a) As a phenomenon, this was a little different from ordinary ancestor-worship, of the type that was common all over the world during the agrarian period - in that Greco-Roman civilization was held to be *dead*, and also seen as more antagonistic to the (Christian) host culture than was typical. (b) Let's emphasize, too, that the Renaissance involved curious reversals in the ranking of cultural forms - where the ancient world tended to specialize in words and numbers (philosophy and science), its "rebirth" tended to shift its energies in the direction of pictures and plastics - images, arts, and architecture. And (c) let's not forget that the Renaissance involved more than just "culture": we'll be thinking about *politics*, in particular, but let's not forget the kinds of economic innovation central to the age, from the "rebirth" of chattel slavery to the "birth" of capitalism itself. Anyway, the Renaissance comes and goes, but Stephen Greenblatt's recent *The Swerve: How the World Became Modern* (Norton, 2012), has certainly given it new life for us.

Now, let's take another step closer to Machiavelli, and ask the question: why Italy? The answer may seem obvious, but a necessary precondition was the defeat of any Italian feudal monarchy, the most plausible attempt at which was made by the Hohenstaufen ruler Frederick II, moving up from the south, whose efforts ended with his death in 1250. The Papacy may have been the nominal victor here, but feudalism in Italy was really defeated by the economic power and political spirit of the great northern city-states, Milan and Florence above all. By 1450, after endless internecine warfare, a precarious peace was established between a number independent political units: the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily in the South, the Papal States in the center, and the city-states of Florence, Milan, Genoa, and Venice in the north - just to name

the big and rich four, since there were plenty of others, of course. The rest of Europe had meanwhile dissolved into chaos, leaving the Italian states a long period of blessed freedom from external interference. You can thus think of the Renaissance as the name for what the Italians did with that freedom.

Finally, what was the political shape of the Italian states? Naples and the Papal states were always "principalities" - the word Machiavelli used for monarchy. The northern city-states, on the other hand, tended to undergo a wrenching evolution: starting out predominantly as aristocratic republics, they one by one tended to fall under the control of *signorie* - the local dynasties that Machiavelli theorized as "new" principalities. Take his hometown, for example. The proud possessor of a republican constitution, Florence was firmly controlled by the Medici family, whose wealth came from banking, after 1434. Then the great catastrophe occurred. In 1494, a reinvigorated French monarchy invaded Italy, soon followed by the even more vigorous Spaniards. The result in Florence was the expulsion of the Medici and restoration of the Republic, but only temporarily: when the Spanish gained the upper hand in Italy permanently in 1512, they re-installed the Medici in power there, soon enough as "dukes." "Liberty" was finished in Florence, as elsewhere in the Italian peninsula, controlled, for the next three centuries, by external powers. A kind of afterglow lingered for a very long time, helping to spread Renaissance *culture* all over Europe - again, think of Shakespeare - but the thing itself was dead.

Niccolò Machiavelli, 1469-1527

And so we arrive at Machiavelli. It is no mean feat, of course, to make your name into a household word for "evil." The question of Machiavelli's association with diabolism is something that we will want to address – is it more than just a myth? What there is no doubt about is that Machiavelli was indeed the first of the "dark thinkers of the bourgeoisie," whose ranks would eventually include Hobbes, Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Freud - social philosophers whose names are synonymous with *scandal*, of one kind or another. And don't think, thereby, that this is yet another detour away from democracy – let me just point out that the most important recent book on Machiavelli in the Anglosphere, by John McCormick, is called *Machiavellian Democracy* (Cambridge, 2011).

As for biography, the collective catastrophe of the loss of Florentine and Italian independence was Machiavelli's personal nightmare as well. Born to a family of Florentine lawyers in 1469, he became secretary and Second Chancellor to the restored Republic in 1498 (just after the short

episode when Florence fell under the spell of the fiery Dominican preacher, Girolamo Savonarola). As such, Machiavelli traveled widely in Italy, negotiating with French kings and German emperors, with Cesare Borgia and Pope Julius II; in 1507, he helped organize Florence's new militia. But with the return of the Medici in 1512, Machiavelli was arrested, tortured, and exiled to his farm near San Casciano. His revenge was literary: by his death in 1527, he had written *The Prince*, the *Discourses on Livy*, and *The Art of War*, his chief political works, as well as a couple of sparkling comedies, *The Mandragola* and *Clizia*, and a melancholy *History of Florence*. There is a lot of controversy about the relation of *The Prince* to the *Discourses*, both of which were only published posthumously, in 1532 and 1531, respectively. The best current guess is that *The Prince* was written with a very specific audience and goal in mind – the Medici family, whom Machiavelli thought had a gold opportunity, before 1519, to combine control over Florence *and* over the Papacy – which he wanted them to use to "liberate" Italy, in some sense. Alas, it was not to be – though here we are reading about it, all these centuries later.

The Prince

We'll be focusing on specific portions of the text – Chapters 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 12-26.   But at least some of you will find attached to your edition of *The Prince* Machiavelli's famous letter to his old friend Vettori, begging for a job. If his evocation of the miseries of his exile and his devotion to the ancients doesn't bring a tear to your eye, then you are a heartless wretch. In any case, here is a brief reading of the text as a whole – including the bits that we're skipping over - in terms of its *structure*, key *terms*, and central *themes*:

(1) The first five chapters form a bloc, devoted to introducing the typology that governs Machiavelli's analysis, and dispensing with the topics in which he is (seemingly) uninterested. The first chapter reveals Machiavelli's relentless dichotomization in all its splendor. Never mind chapters 3 and 5: but if you put 2 and 4 together, then you have Machiavelli's analysis of *monarchy*, the chief form of government in the world. If you are alert, you will pay special attention to the differences between France and Turkey . .

(2) But Machiavelli is really only interested in the forms of government found in contemporary Italy, the topic of chapters 6 through 11. Above all, the late Renaissance was the world of the "new" principality, differentiated here the means of its acquisition -- either by one's own arms and "virtue," or by "fortune." The examples of the former (6) include an astonishing roster of characters, the latter (7), the unforgettable Cesare Borgia. What we're skipping are some exceptions and anomalies: "crime" in 8, "constitutional" principality in 9; "ecclesiastical" in 11. But Machiavelli's verdict is clear enough, I think.

(3) And the lesson is rammed home forcefully in chapters 12-14, whose topic is, in fact, arms. Here you have Machiavelli's unrelenting assault on mercenary armies and advocacy of

militias -- which couldn't possibly be more out of step with his time. As for chapter 14 -- no, that never goes out of fashion!

(4) But we have yet to come to the real *scandal* of *The Prince*. That commences with chapter 15 and continues through chapter 23. The outrage here was very simple - the severing of ties between politics and "virtue," announced in 15 - the prince must learn *not* to be "virtuous." Actually it's more complicated than that, since the apparent advocacy of vice is tempered in a number of ways: the distinction between the short- and long-run (16), the need to maintain the *appearance* of virtue (18), the importance of avoiding the *hatred* of one's subjects (19). Still, the slippage from the Centaur to the Lion and the Fox in 18 says it all -- the world of politics and society, of human beings living together, was, for Machiavelli, *beastly*. How in this wide world did he come to think that?

(5) The answer is plain to see in the last three chapters, which build to a kind of hysterical conclusion. Chapter 24 returns us to the "problem" of Italy with a vengeance. Chapter 25 is the philosophical center of gravity of *The Prince*. Here at last is the analysis of the concept of "fortune" for which we've been waiting - a neo-pagan (that is to say, non-Christian) concept, to be sure, but one rendered absolutely unique ("modern," if you like) by Machiavelli's two unforgettable metaphors -- fortune is "like a river," and "fortune is a woman." The shift from nature back to the human world is startling and utterly symptomatic of Machiavelli's impasse - which makes the "exhortation to free Italy from the barbarians" with which *The Prince* concludes (26) all the more vain and pathetic. Here at last you hear two sentimental words that you don't usually associate with Machiavelli, but which you should -   "justice" and "love."

Discourses on Livy

This book is just what it says – a kind of meta-commentary on the *History* of the Roman Republic by the Roman historian Titus Livius Patavinus (59 BCE- 17 CE), known as "Livy" in English. It's much longer than *The Prince*, and our brief excerpts are almost all from the first of its three Books:

Dedication to Buondelmonti and Rucelli: unlike *The Prince*, the *Discourses* is dedicated to friends, and not just any friends – "not those who are princes, but those who, because of their numerous good qualities, deserve to be princes."

Book One, Introduction. It is as dangerous as sailing the seas, but I am embarking here on a new path, says Machiavelli: urging the imitation of ancient politics, in the same spirit that

lawyers and doctors follow their model. Why don't we do this more often? It's less the fault of the Church than our ignorance of history – hence, my study of Livy.

Book One, Chapter 2. Here, then you get what I hope is a pretty familiar analysis of the types of constitutions there are; of what causes change in the forms of government; and how two polities managed to escape from the cycle. Remind you of anybody?

Book One, Chapter 7. Here is something a little different – a kind of defense of ostracism, of the kind from which Socrates, say, might be held to have suffered. Sounds kind of nasty – but it beats the alternative, thinks Machiavelli.

Book One, Chapter 9. Livy repeats the story – Rome was founded by Romulus, who, with his twin brother Remus, was the child of an unwed mother, abandoned and raise by wolves; Romulus killed Remus in a dispute, and founded Rome all alone. Machiavelli's verdict?

Book One, Chapter 10. Machiavelli goes on to some more general conclusions, which involve a very harsh judgment on Julius Caesar.

 Book One, Chapter 11. On to the topic of religion, in which we discover the second king of Rome, Numa Pompilius, the organizer of Roman religion and the calendar, was even greater than Romulus.

Book One, Chapter 12. And we move on to some more general statements of religion, which involve a very harsh judgment on the Roman Church (the Intro notwithstanding).

Book One, Chapter 58. Bet you're glad we've skipped over all those chapters in between – but this one is one of the stars of our show, in which Machiavelli argues that the "masses are wiser and more constant than a Prince."

Book Two, Introduction. And our selections end with some more general remarks about history, human nature, and what we might call "renaissances."

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↕ 9/13: English Revolutions, Natural Rights and the Social Contract

Lecture Notes 9/13

We've got a lot of work cut out for ourselves today, in preparation for Thursday's discussion of the readings from Locke and Hume, and next Tuesday's debate – hence the extremely long-winded study guide, whose purpose is to let us skip over the all the glorious detail here, once we're in class. But we've got to turn our attention, first, to Britain, in the 17th and 18th centuries; then to "social contract" theory – the strikingly new way of thinking about political legitimacy (and much else besides), which made its debut in the same period; and finally to Locke and Hume in particular.

(1) From English Absolutism to the United Kingdom

Of course, were we really to do this right, we'd have to go after the Reformation in the same spirit that we tackled the Renaissance - from Lutheranism's successful struggle for survival in the first half of the 16th century, to the "religious wars" between majority Catholics and minority Calvinists that tore apart France in the second half, then the revolt of the Calvinists in the Netherlands against their Spanish, Catholic overlords, to, finally, the Thirty-Years' War (1618-1648) – the closest thing Europe had seen yet to a "world war," fought across the continent. The outcome, for religion, was the survival of Calvinism – embodied, above all, in the independence of the "United Provinces" or "Dutch Republic," which the Spanish officially conceded in 1648. In theory, this should be big news for the history of "democracy" – the first successful challenge to divine-right monarchy in European history (with the possible exception of the independence of the Swiss Confederation from Austria). It's pretty obviously related to the *second* of these, the English overthrow of absolute monarchy in two bouts of civil war, 1640-49 and 1688-89 – it can't be an accident that the English emerged from the latter with a *Dutch* "king," after all. Still, we'll step over the Dutch Revolt and move straight on to the English Revolutions. But this requires a little background – though here, too, we have to skip over the peculiarities of the medieval English monarchy, the launching of English Absolutism under the Tudors – who then launched the English Reformation as well.

The Stuart Monarchy and Civil War (1603-1660)

   (1) You'll recall that the Tudor line expired with Elizabeth I in 1602 – and that the successor Stuart dynasty wasn't English at all, but from Scotland, like Ireland, another Celtic zone that had been totally outside the Roman Empire. By the early-modern period, Scotland was divided between a fully Anglicized Lowlands and a still-Celtic, and clannish, Highlands; James VI and I came from a country the opposite of England – with powerfully independent and well-armed nobles and a weak Parliament. James was a Calvinist – but one with very decided ideas about what an Absolutist monarchy ought to look like, which he put into practice, as best he could. And his son, Charles I, did the same, when he took over in 1626, combining a pro-Spanish foreign policy with lavish court expenditure, and, ideologically, a "High Church" ritualism and emphatic insistence on "divine-right" politics. Now a serious wedge was driven between the Court and a large part of the English aristocracy, both in the countryside and in London, and, for the first time, resistance came to be centered on Parliament itself. Charles I's response was like that of many continental rulers – to try to live without Parliament, collecting money for the state through all sorts of other contrivances.

(2) This worked for nearly 10 years, after 1629, when Charles stopped convening Parliament – but it only worked so long as England remained at peace and didn't need an army. The monarchy then broke apart at its weakest links. By 1638, Scotland, more "Puritan" than England itself, had had enough with Charles's "High Church" Anglicanism, and, quite well armed, rose in revolt. Charles was forced to call Parliament, to get together an army in response – the "Long Parliament," which met for some thirteen years, and which immediately proceeded to dismantle all the advances he had more toward a more "absolute" monarchy. Then, a year later, the Irish, taking advantage of all this turmoil, and desperate to escape the English boot, rose in rebellion as well. And it was the struggle over who would control the army that had to be raised to restore control over Ireland that then pitched the Court and the English Parliament into the civil war itself.

(2) As in any civil war, the taking of sides was complicated matter, dividing the landowning ruling class almost in two – there was the politics of Court vs. Parliaments, but, obviously, both religion (Anglicans vs. Puritans), and regionalism (with most of the south and east, and London itself, supporting Parliament) had their roles. Genuine battlefield fighting didn't really get underway until 1642, and both sides were fairly evenly divided for the next two or three years. What tipped the scales was probably a decisive margin of London merchants coming in on the Parliamentary side, together with the emergence of an effective war leader, in the person of Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), and his organization of a much more effective fighting force – the "New Model Army." By 1647 Charles had been defeated on the battlefield and was in Parliamentary custody; his subsequent escape and return to the battlefield helped to force Parliament's hand: tried for treason, in January 1649 Charles I became the first European monarch to be judicially executed by his subjects.

(3) This was a very delicate moment, in British and modern European history – why, you might even call it a "Machiavellian moment." This was the context for the famous "Leveller" writings – which came from more radical elements of the New Model Army that thought what was called for, if not "democracy," was at least a representative electoral regime based on universal male suffrage – as well as for the famous works of Thomas Hobbes, representing what is usually taken to be the opposite case. What actually ensued would have pleased neither Levellers nor Hobbes – political failure, after military victory. The winners, Cromwell at the head the Army, and his supporters in a whittled-down ("Rump") Parliament, proceeded to craft a constitution – "Instrument of Government" - for an English Republic ("Commonwealth"), bestowing legislative sovereignty on Parliament and a good deal of executive power on Cromwell himself, as "Lord Protector." It didn't work: within a couple of years, infighting was so grave that Cromwell had dissolved Parliament, declared martial law, and ruled for a short time as a *de facto* military dictator. Indeed, Cromwell's one success was military – the total crushing of the Irish rebellion, in still more vicious fashion. But his early death, with no fit successor or plan for one, made what followed virtually inevitable.

Restoration, Glorious Revolution, Hanoverian Monarchy and British Empire

(1) So the first English Revolution ended like the first French one - with the Restoration of the dynasty that had been overthrown. On the surface, Charles II (r. 1660-1685) worked out a deal with Parliament, for sharing legislative and fiscal power; behind the scenes, however, he negotiated secretly with the French monarchy, accepting money in exchange for support of the French against the Dutch, and planning the restoration of Catholicism and divine-right rule. By the turn of the 1680s, critics in Parliament, looking ahead to Charles's openly Catholic brother James, attempted to "exclude" Catholics from the throne - and this was the precise context in which John Locke took on Robert Filmer, in his *Two Treatises of Government*. Beyond the struggles of the moment, you could already glimpse the remote origins of a "party" system, in the confrontation between conservative "Tory" and progressive "Whig" factions in Parliament.

(2) James's accession to the throne in 1685 already provoked rebellions in England and Scotland; his successful production of an heir in 1688 then brought things to a head. A faction within Parliament offered the throne to James's Protestant daughter Mary and her Dutch husband William of Orange, who made a carefully planned

"invasion" of England in November 1688. James II fled to France, never to return; William called a "Convention Parliament" in January 1689, and worked out a deal, embodied in a "Bill of Rights" that established the legislative sovereignty of Parliament, placed limits on the executive power of the court, and extended some religious toleration - though not to Catholics, of course. The "Glorious Revolution," as it came to be called, came to include the founding of the Bank of England in 1694, to manage public debt; a further extension of English domination over Ireland; and then fully-fledged Union with Scotland in 1707, when the Scottish Parliament was absorbed into the English. Political arrangements at home were finally completed, when, at the death of Mary's sister Anne in 1714, the crown was passed on to a distant cousin, George, ruler of the tiny German principality of Hanover, whose heirs served as monarchs of Great Britain down to the death of Victoria in 1901.

   (3) But what *was* the Hanoverian monarchy, exactly? Its shrewdest 18th-century observer, the Frenchman Montesquieu, called it "a republic disguised as a monarchy"; more particularly, Montesquieu saw Great Britain as a kind of "mixed government," also embodying a particular "separation" of powers, which then "checked and balanced" one another - a monarchical executive sharing legislative power with a Parliament, divided into an "aristocratic" House of Lords and "democratic" House of Commons. Be that as it may, there is and was no question whose Interests were represented in this complex machinery - both factions within both Houses of Parliament, as well as the ministers (especially the new "Prime Minister") who actually ran the executive, were primarily drawn from a single social class, the landowning "gentry," which comprised around 2% of the total population of Great Britain. This was the oldest, richest, most commercially-oriented agrarian elite in all of Europe, and it lorded it over whatever other rich classes there were in England - merchants, financiers, manufacturers - not to mention everybody else.

   (4) As it happened, it was "Whig" grandees who dominated Parliament and the executive Cabinet alike through most of the 18th-century - down to the point where the American and then French Revolutions really shook things up. The most famous of these were Robert Walpole (1676-1745), Prime Minister to both George I (1714-27) and George II (1727-60), who proved to be marvelously adept at managing relations between Parliament and Crown; and William Pitt the Elder (1708-78), who ran the show in the later years of the reign of George II. As you may recall, Pitt the Elder's crowning achievement was in foreign policy - his successful drubbing of France in the Seven Years' War (1756-63), in the course of which Britain annexed most of the French empire in North America and ejected the French permanently from the Indian Subcontinent. Wait - did you say *North America* and *India*? What on earth were the English and French doing in those faraway places? Oh, you know the answer to that - by the 18th century, the French and English had caught up with and surpassed their Portuguese and Spanish predecessors, particularly when it came to establishing lucrative slave plantations, producing sugar, then tobacco and cotton, in the so-called "New World." Wait - did you say *slave* plantations? You betcha. In any case, you also already know what the main consequence of British victory in the Seven Years' War was - it virtually guaranteed the outbreak of two interconnected revolutions, first the American, and then the French. Whether these were also "glorious" or not depended on one's point of few - but from the start, plenty of observers thought they were "democratic." So stay tuned for that!

(2) Natural Law and Rights, Contracts, Sovereignty

   (1) Now, while all that revolutionary turmoil was going on in the Low Countries and the British Isles, a great ideological revolution was taking place in the realm of political thought. This was the arrival of an entirely new way of looking at politics, that goes by different names - "natural rights theory," "natural jurisprudence," "state-of-nature theory," "social contract theory." In a sense, this should need no introduction, since all of us are supposed to speak this language fluently, as our mother tongue - already by the later 18th-century, Jefferson and Paine could treat rights-theory as truths so "self-evident" that you scarcely needed to spell them out. It's worth noting, however, that at precisely the same time, other philosophers - e.g., David Hume and Jeremy Bentham, perhaps even Edmund Burke - had already decided that all this talk about "rights" and "contracts" was confusing and dangerous nonsense - "nonsense upon stilts," as Bentham put it.

(2) So what was "natural rights theory"? I suggest that you imagine a succession of thinkers, who shared a particular way of thinking about politics and the state - a "paradigm," if you will - stretching from Hugo Grotius, the Netherlands, in the first half of the 17th-century; to John Selden, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, in England, right through the 17th century; to Samuel Pufendorf, in Germany, also in the later 17th-century; to many 18th-century successors, of which Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from Geneva, was the most intersting and the most radical; to the great ideologists of the American, French, and Latin American revolutions of 1776-1826, who appealed to "rights theory" to justify their rebellions. What they all shared was fitting a series of ideas together - that of equal "natural rights," that of a social "contract" or convention, as founding a state, and that of "sovereignty," as the central token of state power - in particular ways. Jefferson's distillation, at start of the American 'Declaration of Independence,' is as good as any - though even there, you immediately encounter one of the deepest cleavages within "natural rights" theories - are these rights "alienable" or not?

(3) Nor is that necessarily the most essential point of fracture within the tradition. As you can no doubt already guess, even the foundational contrast, between a "state of nature" and "civil society," can be interpreted in quite different ways - at one end of the spectrum, it's just a device of abstraction, a thought-experiment designed to highlight what are the real component parts of any society - individual human beings, with "rights" and "reasons" for acting; at the other end, it can be seen as already a historical periodization - *at first,* human beings really did inhabit a "state of nature," with no political states to speak of (and still did, in North America and other parts of the world, in the 17th century); but for most of us, "nature" in that sense is now gone, probably forever, since we now inhabit what is basically a world of very strong states - *very*. But is that a good thing or a bad thing? Here, of course, is another instance of profound disagreement, within the larger tradition. Take Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example. Separated by a century, and comng from utterly different backgrounds, they depicted the "state of nature" in starkly contrasting terms - the first, as a "state of war of all against all," in which life was "nasty, brutish, and short," mercifully left behind us by the advent of civilization, in which strong sovereign states act as umpires overseeing a world of peaceful, mutually beneficial competition; while Rousseau's "state of nature," if not exatly the lost utopia of equality and liberty it was often made out to be, it certainly compared favorably with the world we have with the emergence of "states," who typically use use their sovereignty primarily to protect the grotesque inequalities of all "civilized" polities. Well, like sacred scripture, the Devil, and everybody else, can use "natural rights" for practical any purpose they like . . . which is precisely why a distinguished line of thinkers have objected to the whole idea of "rights," as confused terminology for other things altogether - "goods," "needs," "wants," etc.

(3) Locke

As for John Locke (1632-1704), here we encounter a major thinker of the "scientific revolution" - indeed, in the 18th century he was much more widely admired for his epistemology (the notion that it was John Locke who had demolished the notion of "innate ideas," by demonstrating that the basic truth of empiricism - "nothing is in the mind that does not come in through the senses" - was repeated endlessly during the Enlightenment) than for his politics. He was an early pioneer of economic thought as well. As for making a living - like Hobbes, Locke was basically a servant of the rich (though rich enough himself to invest in the slave trade in the New World). This could be a dangerous proposition: his boss Shaftesbury was charged with treason in 1783; he escaped execution, but Locke himself went into exile in the Netherlands for a time. His most famous work of politics, an answer to Filmer entitled *Two Treatises of Government,* was published - anonymously, of course - in 1689, but was written well before that, during the period of the "exclusion crisis." What you've got in your readings is a string of chapters (or excerpts thereof) from the *Second* treatise, where, after having destroyed Filmer, Locke spells out his own version of contract theory:

Chapter 1: Of Civil Government. Locke summarizes the spanking he's given Filmer - today's kings are *not* the heirs of "Adam," for crying out loud. You'll understand that Filmer was a Christian - but so was Locke, though of a very different kind, one of those Calvinists you hear so much about.

Chapter 2: Of the State of Nature. So "political" power is different from that of fathers and husbands - to understand it, you've got to consider what it's like when there is no "political" power - as in the "state of nature." Perfect freedom, equality (says "the judicious Hooker" - never far from Locke's mind); and a state of liberty - but not one of "license," for the "state of nature" has a "law of nature" to govern it.

Chapter 3: Of the State of War. Speak of the devil, *here* is Hobbes's "state of nature" - but for Locke, not to be confused with the "state of nature" at all.

Chapter 4: Of Slavery. And that leads to Locke's way of looking at "slavery" - nothing but "the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive." Well, well.

Chapter 5: Of Property. Speaking of slavery, what about "property" in the more general sense of the term? Here's probably the most famous chapter in the whole book. The problem is to explain how we got from the communal property original decreed by the deity (e.g., Psalm 115:16) to private property. What follows is the famous "labor" theory of property - your body, and its labors, is already your private property from the start - and other items become yours, with the same title, when you "mix" your labor with them - picking up an apple, etc. Well, not just "yours," exactly: "Thus the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my *property*, with the assignation or consent of any body*. The *labour* that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath *fixed* my *property* in them . . . " Well, well, well.

Chapter 6: Of Paternal Power. Back to Filmer, briefly - he can't even get paternal power straight.

Chapter 7: Of Political or Civil Society: So, it's not terribly different from Hobbes, is it? It makes sense for you to surrender your power to enforce the law of nature and punish law-breakers to a neutral third party – and that's what a government is and what a government does, apparently.

Chapter 8: Of the Beginning of Civil Societies. And its only origin lies in "consent" – well, consent of the "majority," that is, since anything beyond that is impossible, apparently.

Chapter 9: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government. "The great and *chief end*, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, *is the preservation of their property*. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting." Enough said – though let me draw your attention to the pivotal role played by that modest possessive, "their." I mean - what if you don't really have any property, either before, or, especially after, the transition to "civil society"?

Chapter 11: Of the Extent of Legislative Power. Moving on, "legislative power" is the supreme power, of course – but *not* "arbitrary," it must rule "by law," it cannot take property without consent, etc., etc.

Chapter 12: Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth. Here's an early statement of the "separation of powers" doctrine, which started life based on the binary distinction between "law-making" and "law-executing" powers, whose combination in the same hands was supposed to threaten liberty; like many other 17th-century thinkers, Locke hadn't quite glimpsed the idea of "judicial power" as "separate" from legislative – but here defines "federative" power as what we might call "foreign policy."

Chapter 13: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth. And for all you democrats - or at least, "populists" - in the audience, here is a relatively straightforward statement of popular sovereignty . . .

Chapter 14: Of Prerogative . . . which is then balanced, so to speak, by an equally generous understanding of the "prerogative" powers of the executive. Why, Locke appears to have something for everybody . . .

Chapter 15: Of Tyranny . . . well, everybody except "tyrants," apparently. "Wherever law ends, tyranny begins," in Islander idiom.

Chapter 16: Of the Dissolution of Government. And here - why, here Locke appears to continue in the same direction, shooting past the right to "resistance," to - what, is Locke here actually justifying "rebellion" - *revolution*? "To this I reply, 'The people shall be judge.'"

(4) Hume

(1) David Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711. He devoted himself to a literary career from a very early age, having rejected more obvious pursuits such as law or business; and he had the advantage of a fully French education. By 1739, Hume had complete and published his precocious masterpiece, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* the most commanding work of English philosophy since Locke's *Essay*. Although Hume was disappointed by its reception, and by his subsequent failure to secure an academic post in Edinburgh, he continued to write and publish during years of wandeirng around Europe. A first collection of his *Essays* appeared in 1741-2; then *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* in 1748 (revised in 1758) and *An Enquiry Concdering the Principles of Morals* in 1751, both revisions of parts of the *Treatise*. Returning to Edinburgh in 1752, Hume produced a six-volume *History of England* (1754-62), making him the most famous historian of the epoch, as well as many more *Essays*, showing him to be a pioneer of economic thought. He endured the contretemps with Rousseau in the mid-1760s with reasonable dignity, and died in 1776, the object of the sort of hubbub that typically attended the deathbeds of notorious atheists at the time.

(2) Hume was, in any case, only the greatest of a remarkable constellation of intellectuls - Lord Kames, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, among them - whose work collectively constitues the "Scottish Enlightenment." As in France, the intellectual effervescence of mid-18th-century Scotland had everything to do with the contrast between it and the relatively more "advanced" society to the south, with which Scotland was, of course, poliitcally united after 1707. "Development" is one of the great themes of the social thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, and it is important that both Hume and Adam Smith approached their main object - England - as more or less provincial outsiders.

(3) In any case, if there's little doubt about the *chief* target of attack in "Of the Original Contract," it's probably worth keeping in mind the fact that the argument is book-ended by an even more brusque dismissal of any appeals to theocracy. The grounds on which Hume rejects appeals to "consent" and "contract theory" - rejects Locke, that is (not to mention Jefferson or Tom Paine) - are probably clear enough to require no summary here. More interesting, perhaps, is to try to determine the ratio of "conservatism" and "radicalism" in Hume's thought and its implications - the latter, in particular, might look quite different, in different historical circumstances. Just something to think about, as we prepare for the next Great Debate!

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⇅ 9/22: "Enlightenment and Progress"

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Lecture Notes 9/22: "Enlightenment and Progress"

We need to backtrack a bit, in regard to the history of ideas. For between the time of Locke and that of Hume, a sort of pan-European intellectual movement had reached its maturity. This was the so-called "Enlightenment" – a very loosely-related set of thinkers and their publications, whose influence could be felt everywhere, from Poland to the British colonies of North America, but whose main centers of production were France, Scotland, and Italy – all countries a bit nervous about the lead that the United Kingdom was taking in European affairs. What "Enlightened" thinkers shared was a general skepticism about revealed religion; a novel confidence in the powers of human knowledge or "science"; a belief that most governments need reform, in one direction or another; a commitment to developing new human sciences – politics and economics, in particular; and a desire to express all these ideas artistically, in literature and music, above all. Those were just generalities, however – there was fierce disagreement and debate about all the specifics.

And no subject was more fiercely debated in the 18th-century than that of "historical progress" – roughly speaking, the question of whether human history exhibited orderly, developmental change over time, and, if so, what changed, and was the change for good or for ill. If it is roughly accurate to say that most Enlightenment thinkers agreed that developmental change had occurred, both in the shape of society and in the character of human ideas, and that the change was for the most part good – i.e., they believed in "progress," and sometimes predicted that more of it was to come – that's only a generalization. There were plenty of exceptions, and always lots of debate over the issue.

The most pointed case *against* any simple-minded idea of "progress" came from the pen of one of the 18th century's greatest writers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). As everyone knows, not least because he pioneered modern autobiography with his *Confessions*, Rousseau was born a citizen of Geneva, then an independent Calvinist city-state, not even part of the Swiss Confederation. He ran away from home at 17, to Savoy, where he converted to Catholicism briefly and fell into the arms of an older woman, who supplied him with the only education he ever received. Rousseau was a slow starter, but made it to Paris by the late 1740s, where fell into the company of crucial figures of the French Enlightenment such as Diderot and d'Alember, the editors of the famous *Encyclodpedia of Arts, Sciences, and Letters*.

Rousseau's first independent publication, the "Discourse on Arts and Sciences" made him famous overnight – above all, since it constituted the first serious attack on the idea that more knowledge necessarily or automatically improved human life and society. You've got a selection from a pretty lousy 18th-century translation of what's known as the "First Discourse" – but enough to get the gist. The specific question was whether the "re-establishment of the arts and sciences" (i.e., what we'd call the Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution) "corrupted or purged our morals?" "Morals" might better be translated as "ethics," in the comprehensive

sense – the science of happiness. And you can at least tell what Rousseau's answer was – no, pretty clearly not, especially if you really think about ancient Greece and Rome. That "no" was taken as a deep affront to what was already a culture of profound self-satisfaction and self-congratulation in Europe.

 But the "First Discourse" was a trifle compared with the "Second," the "Discourse on Inequality," which followed in 1755 – this is the truly important work here, no least because it was a full-bore attack on conventional atural rights theory of the time – on Hobbes *and* Locke. And you've got little bits from the introduction, defining terms; from Part One, Rousseau's own depiction of what the "state of nature" was for human beings; and from Part Two, Rousseau's account of the development of civilization. We'll go over the latter in some detail in class. The important thing is not to make a cartoon out of his critique of conventional ideas of "progress" – to capture its nuances. For one thing, Rousseau was no fan of the "state of nature" – our exit from it, however it happened, was a good thing, both in the short term – the first, "savage" phase of human history was the happiest – and in the long term, at least in potential. If that potential wasn't fulfilled, it's because, he explains, of what the actual "social contracts" we have have wrought – basically tyrannical oligarchies, as far as the eye can see. Real change has occurred – but the benefits of this "progress" have plainly been distributed very, very unequally, enough so to raise deep questions about our confidence in all this.

Rousseau himself went on to pdropose one kind of solution to the problem in his own *On the Social Contract* – a radically democratic version of a *just* social contract, rather than an *unjust* one. Meanwhile, however, his reading of human history provoked all kinds of responses. We needn't say too much about Voltaire's – his famous letter to Rousseau about the "Second Discourse" was obviously a deliberate misreading; behind his Voltaire's touchiness, however, was his own skepticism that history involved all that much change, for either better or worse. More important for our purposes – you debaters in particular – is the fact the Natural Rights tradition had gradually been morphing, throughout the century, into what we'd call "economics" – and at its heart was the famous "Four-Stages" theory, of stadial development through "modes of subsistence," that you find in *nuce* in that little section from Adam Smith's lectures on jurisprudence.

This idea – that societies were obviously evolving in an ever-more prosperous, and therefore freer and happier direction – was found everywhere in the late 18th-century – especially once you added the further intoxicating ingredient of political "revolution," as in "American" and "French." So our end point is the rather amazing declarations of belief in "progress" whose classic forms you can see in its English version in the (misdated) bit by Priestley and its French counterpart in Condorcet – both equally intoxicated. You might be tempted of course to say that, "Well, it Rousseau had lived long enough to see the American and French Revolutions, he might have been a little less pessimistic - maybe they opened the way to modern democracy, which has by and large realized his hopes for the a just social contract?" But you you be right? *That* is the question to debate!

↕ 10/4: Democracy and Revolution

HST & POS 112 -2016

Lecture Notes 10/4: "Democracy and Revolution

Talk about progress – we have arrived at the Age of Revolution, or to what today are often called the "Atlantic" revolutions. It wasn't so long ago that you could also label them "bourgeois," in the Marxist sense, or "democratic," as in R. R. Palmer's *Age of the Democratic Revolution*. The preference for "Atlantic" today recognizes a certain nervousness or uncertainty about the relations of these revolutions to capitalism and democracy – but also a reminder of the central role that Europe's overseas colonies played in the demise of the "Old Regime" between 1776 and 1826. Today, this looks like one long chain of revolutions – the successful revolt Britain's North American colonies having helped to sink the Bourbon Monarchy in France, and whose consequences then led – in addition to the Haitian Revolution – to the wars of independence of Latin America, between 1810 and 1826. In any case, however you feel about "democracy," there's little doubt about the absolute centrality of "natural rights" to the ideology justifying the Atlantic Revolutions.

For better or for worse, the French Revolution made a rather bigger splash than the American – though we'll be returning to that terrain next week. You know the basic story: how the Bourbon Monarchy of France stumbled into the Revolution, via bankruptcy; and how the Third Estate took control of the government in the summer of 1789, issued a "Declaration of Rights," abolished what remained of "feudalism," and set about writing a new constitution for a France – a constitutional monarchy, with a unicameral legislature, elected by male property-owners, with executive power bestowed on a king with a "suspensive" veto. The National Assembly also nationalized Church property, and used it to launch a paper currency. In any case, the new constitution wasn't finished until August 1791; and it was overthrown just a year later, replaced with the First Republic – which lasted until Bonaparte declared the First Empire in 1804 – which was itself gone, and the Bourbon Monarchy restored, in 1815. And if that makes your head swim, let's note that the restored monarchy was overthrown in 1830, and replaced with a constitutional monarchy – which was overthrown and replaced by a Second Republic in 1848, which was overthrown by its first President, the nephew of Napoleon I, who established the

Second Empire in 1851 – which, defeated by the Prussians on the battlefield in 1870, was overthrown as well. Man, that's a whole lot of overthrowing! In any case, France finally put an end to all this, by setting up a fairly stable Third Republic in 1877. They're on to the Fifth or Sixth today - but you know what I mean.

Edmund Burke

Burke (1729-1797) has the distinction of being perhaps the *first* "conservative" in the modern world, the Founding Father of the entire tradition - or so they say. He earned this honor by launching the first and by far the greatest of all attacks on the French Revolution, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, published in November 1790. You'll notice how very *early* that date is – before the new constitution was even finished, before the outbreak of war, before the First Republic and Reign of Terror, long, long before Napoleon.

   (1) There's a lot of Burke here, so let's just divide it up into a few sections. First, pp. 121-129, you've got Burke tooting his horn for the English constitution (the product of a "glorious revolution," mind you). What's so great about England, that the French should have taken it for their example?

   (2) Pp. 129-135. So here's Burke's explanation for the fact that the French chose an "evil" path – why is he not surprised with what their "fond election of evil"?

   (3) Pp. 149-155. But what about the "rights of man," Mr. Burke – what do you think about them? I draw your attention to pp. 150-151 in particular.

   (4) Pp. 169-174. And then there's Burke's unforgettable description of having glimpsed Marie Antoinette at Versailles, sixteen years earlier – which provokes a wonderful passage about "chivalry," supposedly buried in the mud on 6 October 1789 (when the royal family was forced to leave the royal palace at Versailles, for new accommodations in Paris). What's so great about "chivalry," according to Burke?

Tom Paine

Paine (1736-1809) was of course already a seasoned international revolutionary and pamphleteer, long before it was necessary to answer Burke – there's a handy biographical summary at the head of your readings. The first part of his *Rights of Man* was only one of dozens of rejoinders to Burke – but it was way out ahead in terms of sales and resonance. In any case, you have something pretty to closer to a frontal collision here, on every topic:

   (1) Natural rights, and, especially those of the living over the dead (pp. 135-142);

(2) Civil rights, issuing straight out of natural rights (pp. 142-144)

(3) Bad government, based on conquest and usurpation (pp. 144-145)

(4) The good government of the French National Assembly (pp. 145-6)

(5) Nobility and titles (pp. 146-149)

(6) Religion and toleration (pp. 149-), etc., etc.

(7) Hereditary right (pp. 154-161)

(8) Conclusion – the glorious age of the American and French revolutions (pp.-161-165).

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↕ Lecture Notes - Weeks 11 & 12

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HST & POS 112 - 2016

Weeks 11 & 12 - Tocqueville and *Democracy in America*

Alexis Charles-Henri Maurice Clérel de Tocqueville was born in Paris in 1805. He descended from the Norman nobility: his great-grandfather was Malesherbes, a key figure of the French Enlightenment and famous aristocratic victim of the Reign of Terror during the Revolution; his father was a royalist prefect under the Restoration. Tocqueville resolved upon a political career at an early age; despite - or because of? - his family background, his intellectual formation owed a great deal to the emergent Liberalism of the period. The July Revolution of 1830 was a major hinge in his life. His political career temporarily stalled by the establishment of the constitutional monarchy of Louis-Philippe, Tocqueville and the intellectual comrade of his youth, Gustave de Beaumont, embarked on a nine-month tour of the United States in 1831-32. Out of this came not only their joint study of the American penal system, but two great "non-fiction" bestsellers of the time: Beaumont's *Marie, or Slavery in the United States* and the first volume of Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, both published in 1835. The latter made Tocqueville famous overnight. He used royalties from the book to refurbish the family chateau in Normandy; he married Mary Mottely, and Englishwoman, in 1836; and went on to publish a second volume of *Democracy in America* in 1840. In the meantime, Tocqueville was also able to launch the political career of which he dreamed, serving in the Chamber of Deputies from 1839-1848. Among other things, he had the merit of predicting the February Revolution that brought the July Monarchy to its end. The Revolution of 1848 was the climax of Tocqueville's political career. He emerged as one of its leaders after the bloody repression of the "June Days" (of which he left a memorable account), and was one of the authors of the constitution of the short-lived Second Republic, for which he also served as Foreign Minister in 1849. He then watched with horror as the first President of the Republic, an adventurer with a famous name - Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, a nephew of the First Emperor (whom Tocqueville described as an "enigmatic, somber, insignificant numbskull") - overthrew his own government in 1851 and went on to declare the Second Empire. Excluded permanently from political activity, Tocqueville took his revenge by producing a second masterpiece of modern social thought, *The Old Regime and*

the French Revolution, published in 1856, one of whose goals was to explain why "French Revolutions" seemed always to end in Bonapartism. Tocqueville died in 1857.

Selections from *Democracy in America*

You'll find a PDF on Blackboard containg one page from Part Four, Chapter 6 of Volume II of *Democracy in America*, under the title (borrowed from Paul Rahe's book on Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Tocqueville), "Soft Despotism, Democracy's Drift." That's not very much to go on, especially for you respondents (Teams 3 & 14) and debaters ("Resolved, the United States today has indeed fallen prey to 'soft despotism' in the Tocquevillean sense of the term" - Team 7 for the affirmation, 10 for the negation). So what I've done is also to post a link to the library's electronic copy of the Liberty Fund Edition of *Democracy in America* - and then add just a few more pages to your suggested readings, described below, in three parts.

(1) So, first, the "Introduction" to Volume One, first. Now, you might be tempted to breathe a sigh of relief and imagine that with *Democracy in America*, we've at last returned to the ostensible subject of our course. But the first paragraph of the "Introduction" should be enough dispel this idea. For by "democracy," Tocqueville clearly does not mean, in the first instance, a form of political state, but something grander - a specific kind of *society*, characterized by what he terms "the equality of conditions." That is the essence of the "great democratic revolution" to which he alludes in the opening section of the text; and it was his experience of the "equality of conditions" in America, he says, that gave him the idea to write the book. As the section that follows shows, however, his mind was always on France: you get a capsule history of the relentless advance of "democracy in France," as everybody, including the kings themselves, contribute to its "leveling" force. Tocqueville then arrives at a grand statement about the reasons for the unstoppable progress of the "equality of conditions" - attributed to the inscrutable designs of the Christian deity. Just for this reason, he allows in the section that follows, it is not difficult too imagine a democratic society that is "peaceful, regulated, and progressive." But that's not the way it has worked out in France, where government has inherited the powers once possessed by nobles, where the distance between poor and rich has diminished - but mutual hatred increased; and where intellectual developments are still more "deplorable." But Tocqueville cannot accept that the Creator has intended this to be the last word on "democracy" - and thus, he suggests in a last section, that it is well worth considering America, where the "equality of conditions" has evolved in such a way as, perhaps, to give us lessons from which we might profit.

(2) If we turn next to Part Two of Volume One, its Sixth Chapter gives you what you might think of as the good news about democracy - its capacity for inspiring public-spiritedness, its protection of individual rights, its respect for the rule of law, and its high level of political participation - two cheers, even if Tocqueville makes it pretty clear at the end that this is not where his own political choice would lie. But what I really recommend you look at (in the electronic edition) - and especially you debaters - is Part Two, Chapter 7, which turns to the *bad* news about democracy. This is probably the most famous chapter in the book, the depiction of the dire menace of the "tyranny of the majority."   its basis lies in the idea - quite certainly wrong, in Tocqueville's view - that "there is more enlightenment and wisdom in many men when brought together than in one alone." The consequences, against which the idea of a "mixed government" is "a chimera," are disastrous: "[W]hat I find most repugnant in America is not the extreme liberty which prevails there; it is the little guarantee against tyranny that one finds there." No king ever wielded power more absolute than "the people" in the US: "In America, the majority draws a formidable ring around thought. Within these limits, the writer is free; but woe to him if he dares go outside of it . . . The absolute monarchies brought despotism into disrepute; let us take care that the democratic republics do not rehabilitate it and that in making it more oppressive for some, they do not take away from it, in the eyes of the majority, its odious appearance and degrading character . . . "

(3) Volume Two of *Democracy in America* was written some years later, and it involves a general shift of focus from the constitutional-political themes that dominated the first volume to what we might call cultural and ideological issues. Part One looks at intellectual life in the US - there's a distinctive American "philosophical method" (Cartesian individualism run rampant - Chap. 1), the total dominance of "public opinion" (Chap. 2), remarks on the

absolute rule of generalization and abstraction (Chap. 3), the advent of the "age of shoddy" (Chap. 11), etc. Part Two looks at psychology (and "self-interest properly understood"), Part Three at family and women, honor and ambition. Part Four then brings things to an end. Your page on "soft despotism" comes from the heart of Chapter 6 - and you might want to take a look at the whole thing, with a picture of a "despotism" even worse than that of Caligula or Nero, precisely because it is "soft" (shades of Ernest Gellner's "rubber cage"). Chapter 7 then canvasses a bunch of solutions for the menace of "democratic despotism" - so many gestures back in the direction of "aristocracy," and none very convincing. But you might want to take a good look as well at Chapter 8, the real conclusion of the text, which returns us to the macro-historical questions of the Introduction, the role of Christianity in Tocqueville's outlook, and the obvious tension between his fatalism and his apparent belief in free will. In any case, there's plenty about which to debate!

- **HST/POS 112 -2016**
Mid-Term Examination

Choose *one* of the topics below and write a brief essay (in the neighborhood of 1000 words) in response. You should write for a reader who is intelligent, but quite uninformed about the topic; and you should assume that our readings, and what we said in class and in our "Class Notes," are the sum total of what is known about the topic – and you are encouraged to cite our primary sources directly (using page numbers, in parentheses) in making your argument. As for the new due date, please bring a hard copy of your exam to class on **Thursday 13 October.**

(1) Compare and contrast Thucydides and Machiavelli on the subject of "democracy." For the former, the center of attention is of course the "Funeral Oration" - although there's some indirect light shed on the subject in Thucydides's treatment of the civil war in Corcyra and Melian dialogue. As for Machiavelli, the selections from the *Discourses on Livy* are probably your best evidence - particularly Machiavelli's picture of the "mixed governments" of Sparta and Rome in Chapter 2 and his general views on the popular contribution to Roman freedom and power (cf. Chapter 58). Many commentators have seen certain similarities of outlook in Thucydides and Machiavelli – shared assumptions about human nature. and the place of power in politics. Do they share similar views about "democracy" and the "people" – or do you detect certain subtle differences, and if so, how would you account for them?

(2) Compare John Locke's and David Hume's views over contract theory, the state of nature, and natural rights. In your essay, you will want to summarize their differences and then explore the implications of their arguments. In separate sections of your essay, summarize Locke's views of the state of nature, natural law, and inalienable rights. T hen turn to Hume's argument against the contract theory, his view of the state of nature and rights. In your essay you will want to explore their assumptions about human nature and rights, and why both agree that representative government and rights are essential to a well-ordered society, and why Locke assumes these rights are universal and why Hume's argument suggests that these rights are not universal.

Final Paper

You'll find the final paper topic below. Your essay should be in the neighborhood of 1000-1500 words. In addressing the two questions, you should try to make use of specific reference to and citation of our texts (using page-numbers, in parentheses). Reference to secondary works is not necessary, but if you make use of them, you should cite the source in a footnote. Essays will be graded (using a 100-point scale), on both content and form: have a clear opening statement and conclusion, with coherent organization of the argument in between – and don't forget spell-check! Your essay will be due on **Tuesday 6 December**, by 5 p.m.; you should submit it electronically, via Safe Assignment, on our Blackboard site.

As you look back over the class, what is the most *important*, *surprising*, and/or *interesting* thing you have learned about the "foundations of democracy"? What eadings and in-class debates have most *influenced*, *changed* and/or confirmed your thinking, and why?

Thucydides and War
- Attached Files:

    - Thucydides.pdf ⌄ (1.875 MB)

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↕ 9/6: Machiavelli: "Prince," selection from "Discourses on Livy"

⌄ ▭
Attached Files:

    - Discourses.Livy.pdf ⌄ (1.341 MB)

The Prince is very easy to find online - e.g., scroll to the end of the Wiki article on it (which is excellent, by the way), where you'll find "External Links" to a variety of different translatsions (and if you read Italian, all the better). We'll concentrate on Chapters 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 12-26 - but it won't hurt you to read the whole thing, whch is short and sharp.

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↕ 9/15: selections from Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"

⌄ ▭
Attached Files:

    - Locke.pdf ⌄ (2.564 MB)

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↕ 9/15: Hume, "Of the Original Contract"

⌄ ▭
Attached Files:

    - Hum.Original.Contract.pdf ⌄ (2.248 MB)

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↕ 9/27: excerpts from Voltaire & Smith

⌄ ▭
Attached Files:

- 📄 Volatire & Smith.pdf ⌄ (704.692 KB)

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↕ 9/27: excerpts from Priestly and Condorcet

⌄ ▭
Attached Files:

- 📄 Priestly-Condorcet.pdf ⌄ (1.709 MB)

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↕ 9/27: Rousseau, selections from First and Second Discourses

⌄ ▭
Attached Files:

- 📄 Rousseau(1).pdf ⌄ (1.076 MB)

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↕ 10/6: Burke, selection from "Reflections on the Revolution in France"

⌄ ▭
Attached Files:

- 📄 Burke.Reflections.pdf ⌄ (1.532 MB)

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↕ 10/6: Paine, selections from "The Rights of Man"

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Attached Files:

- ▢ Paine.Rights.pdf ⋁ (1.778 MB)

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↕ 10/20: Federalists and Anti-Federalists

⋁ ▭
Attached Files:

- ▢ Anti-Federalist- ⋁ (499.776 KB)
- ▢ Anti-Federalism-P. Henry.pdf ⋁ (1.093 MB)

The selections from "Brutus" and Patrick Henry are attached below. You can find Federalist papers 10 and 51 at this site:

http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-federalist-papers/

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↕ 11/1: Tocqueville and Democracy

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Attached Files:

- ▢ Toqueville- ⋁ (211.313 KB)

You'll find a short passage on "soft despotism" attached below. As for the rest of *Democracy in America*, here's the link to the library's eBook version:

JK216 .T713 2012eb Online

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↕ 11/10: Lincoln-Douglas Debates

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This link will take you the Second Debate at Freeport, first Douglas, then Lincoln:

http://www.bartleby.com/251/22.html

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↕ 11/22: R. M. Hutchins vs. M. Crow

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As we said, to get acquainted with the educational philosophy of Michael M. Crow, it is sufficient to visit the ASU Home Page and tap "President" - up will pop multiple pictures and videos of President Crow in action, microphone in hand, plus links to all kinds of information about "The New American University." As for one of the premier theorists of the *old* American university, Robert Maynard Hutchins, the first link below is to his short article on "Liberal Education" and "The Great Conversation." We've also attached a PDF with a short article about Hutchins, "Men With Ideas," from 1950. The second link below, "The Education Theory of Hutchins," is to a site that organizes quotations from Hutchins around eight key ideas. But for more of Hutchins's bright ideas in his own words, we'd also recommend his appearances in both "Wikiquotes" and "BrainyQuotes" - the latter is particularly entertaining (e.g.: "The three major administrative problems are sex for the students, athletics for the alumni, and parking for the faculty"). And if you don't suffer from Wikiphobia, you can also also take a look at their articles on "Great Books" and "Perennialism," Hutchins having been closely associate with both.
"Liberal Education":

http://www.thegreatideas.org/libeducation.html

"The Educational Theory of Robert Maynard Hutchins"

http://www.newfoundations.com/GALLERY/HutchinsII.html