GENERAL STUDIES COURSE PROPOSAL COVER FORM

Course information: Copy and paste current course information from Class Search/Course Catalog.

College/School: College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
Department/School: School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies
Prefix: HST
Number: 306
Title: Debating the Constitution
Units: 3

Course description: See page 1 of attached syllabus for detailed description of this course topic. Generic catalog description: Specialized topics in United States history. Explores regions, cultures, and issues in history, and their interpretation in historical scholarship.

Is this a cross-listed course? No
Is this a shared course? No

Note- For courses that are crosslisted and/or shared, a letter of support from the chair/director of each department that offers the course is required for each designation requested. By submitting this letter of support, the chair/director agrees to ensure that all faculty teaching the course are aware of the General Studies designation(s) and will teach the course in a manner that meets the criteria for each approved designation.

Is this a permanent-numbered course with topics? Yes

Requested designation: Historical Awareness–H
Mandatory Review: Yes

Eligibility: Permanent numbered courses must have completed the university’s review and approval process. For the rules governing approval of omnibus courses, contact Phyllis.Lucie@asu.edu.

Submission deadlines dates are as follow:
For Fall 2020 Effective Date: October 10, 2019
For Spring 2021 Effective Date: March 5, 2020

Area proposed course will serve:
A single course may be proposed for more than one core or awareness area. A course may satisfy a core area requirement and more than one awareness area requirements concurrently, but may not satisfy requirements in two core areas simultaneously, even if approved for those areas. With departmental consent, an approved General Studies course may be counted toward both the General Studies requirement and the major program of study. It is the responsibility of the chair/director to ensure that all faculty teaching the course are aware of the General Studies designation(s) and adhere to the above guidelines.

Checklists for general studies designations:
Complete and attach the appropriate checklist

Literacy and Critical Inquiry core courses (L)
Mathematics core courses (MA)
Computer/statistics/quantitative applications core courses (CS)
Humanities, Arts and Design core courses (HU)
Social-Behavioral Sciences core courses (SB)
Natural Sciences core courses (SQ/SG)
Cultural Diversity in the United States courses (C)
Global Awareness courses (G)
Historical Awareness courses (H)

A complete proposal should include:
Signed course proposal cover form
Criteria checklist for General Studies designation being requested
Course catalog description
Sample syllabus for the course
Copy of table of contents from the textbook and list of required readings/books

It is respectfully requested that proposals are submitted electronically with all files compiled into one PDF.

Contact information:
Name Marissa Timmerman E-mail Marissa.R.Timmerman@asu.edu Phone 480-727-4029

Department Chair/Director approval: (Required)
Chair/Director name (Typed): Richard Amesbury Date: 7/15/2020
Arizona State University Criteria Checklist for

HISTORICAL AWARENESS [H]

**Rationale and Objectives**

Recent trends in higher education have called for the creation and development of historical consciousness in undergraduates now and in the future. History studies the growth and development of human society from a number of perspectives such as—political, social, economic and/or cultural. From one perspective, historical awareness is a valuable aid in the analysis of present-day problems because historical forces and traditions have created modern life and lie just beneath its surface. From a second perspective, the historical past is an indispensable source of identity and of values, which facilitate social harmony and cooperative effort. Along with this observation, it should be noted that historical study can produce intercultural understanding by tracing cultural differences to their origins in the past. A third perspective on the need for historical awareness is that knowledge of history helps us to learn from the past to make better, more well-informed decisions in the present and the future.

The requirement of a course that is historical in method and content presumes that "history" designates a sequence of past events or a narrative whose intent or effect is to represent both the relationship between events and change over time. The requirement also presumes that these are human events and that history includes all that has been felt, thought, imagined, said, and done by human beings. The opportunities for nurturing historical consciousness are nearly unlimited. History is present in the languages, art, music, literatures, philosophy, religion, and the natural sciences, as well as in the social science traditionally called History.

The justifications for how the course fits each of the criteria need to be clear both in the application tables and the course materials. The Historical Awareness designation requires consistent analysis of the broader historical context of past events and persons, of cause and effect, and of change over time. Providing intermittent, anecdotal historical context of people and events usually will not suffice to meet the Historical Awareness criteria. A Historical Awareness course will instead embed systematic historical analysis in the core of the syllabus, including readings and assignments. For courses focusing on the history of a field of study, the applicant needs to show both how the field of study is affected by political, social, economic, and/or cultural conditions AND how political, social, economic, and/or cultural conditions are affected by the field of study.

Revised October 2015
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
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<td>1. History is a major focus of the course. Syllabus/Schedule and Reading Assignments, sample discussion questions, sample reading</td>
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**THE FOLLOWING ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE:**

- Courses that are merely organized chronologically.
- Courses which are exclusively the history of a field of study or of a field of artistic or professional endeavor.
- Courses whose subject areas merely occurred in the past.
Explain in detail which student activities correspond to the specific designation criteria. Please use the following organizer to explain how the criteria are being met.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria (from checksheet)</th>
<th>How course meets spirit (contextualize specific examples in next column)</th>
<th>Please provide detailed evidence of how course meets criteria (i.e., where in syllabus)</th>
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| 1. History is a major focus of the course | The course covers major Supreme Court decisions in American history, from the early republic through today. Each case/decision is placed in its historical context, and students are expected to employ historical analysis and demonstrate knowledge of key historical events and figures, as well as political and cultural climate, in class discussions and essay exams. | -See entire syllabus, especially course description on page 1 and “Schedule and Reading Assignments” section.  
-See sample discussion questions for Plessy v. Ferguson. We engage in such discussions for each case. |
| 2. The course examines and explains human development as a sequence of events influenced by a variety of factors | Our study of key Supreme Court decisions illustrates and examines human development throughout American history, especially the evolution of human thought. For example, we see the changing values and beliefs about race and civil rights through the related cases of Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Brown v. Topeka Board of Education. We examine the factors that influenced the decisions in these cases, and also how the Supreme Court decisions influenced American society and individual values and beliefs. We examine how the cases relate to and were influenced by the political and cultural climate of the country. In class discussions and in the essay exams, students draw connections between the cases and must explain their context and impact. | See entire "schedule and reading assignments" section of syllabus, as well as sample discussion questions. Also, refer to the specific examples given in #3 below, as they also pertain to this category.  
In syllabus, see Midterm 1 and 2 essay instructions  
-Final exam essay instructions |
3. **There is a disciplined systematic examination of human institutions as they change over time.**

   A significant focus of our course is on examining the evolution of human thought and institutions over time. We explore how the decisions in each case drew upon prior decisions, and how the Supreme Court overturned or upheld prior decisions. As mentioned above, one example is that we examine the changing values and beliefs about race and civil rights through the related cases of Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Brown v. Topeka Board of Education. See additional examples in the column at right. Students read the majority and dissenting opinions for each case, allowing them to see the reasoning process and compare and contrast related cases.

   See entire syllabus and sample discussion questions, but especially the following sections from "Schedule and Reading Assignments:"

   - Week 4 (Dred Scott v. Sandford), Week 5 (Plessy v. Ferguson), and Week 7 (Brown vs. Board of Education), all decisions concerning race and civil rights
   - Week 9 (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan) and Week 12 (Nationalist Socialist Party v. Skokie), both involving free press and free speech
   - Week 10 (Katz v. United States; privacy rights) and Week 11 (Roe vs. Wade; abortion rights)
   - Midterm 1 and 2 essay instructions
   - Final exam essay instructions

4. **The course examines the relationship among events, ideas, and artifacts and the broad social, political and economic context.**

   This history course examines the relationship among events and ideas through an exploration of key Supreme Court cases, placing them within an historical context. We focus on understanding the responses of plaintiffs and defendants, specific ideas of court rulings as to the case, and larger concepts embodied in the decisions in relationship to the Constitution, views of individual rights, government regulatory power, state power, racial views and biases, and the role of the court in relationship to separation of powers and judicial power. These cases are explored in lecture and discussion within the broad social, political and economic—and cultural—context of the time, and changes within a larger historical framework.

   See "Schedule and Reading Assignments" section of syllabus, as well as sample discussion questions.
HST 306 Debating the Constitution
Coor 184
Tuesdays 4:50-7:35PM

Instructors
Justice John Lopez
Donald T. Critchlow

Your contact for this course—emails or office meetings—is Professor Critchlow.

E-mail: Donald.Critchlow@asu.edu

Critchlow Office: Coor 4578; Office Hours T W Th 3:00-4:15 or TBA

Course Description
This course introduces students to major Supreme Court decisions from the early American Republic through today. Students will learn how to analyze court decisions and to develop an understanding of the functions of the Supreme Court. In addition, this course provides students with historical context and analytical tools for understanding critical Supreme Court decisions in American history. Emphasis is placed on legal reasoning as an analytical skill necessary to understand specific court decisions. At the same time, students are offered an opportunity to apply legal reasoning within an historical context by examining and comparing court decisions over the course of American history.

Student Learning Objectives
Upon successful completion of the course, students will have acquired:
1. Basic understandings of constitutional law
2. Argumentative and legal reasoning skills
3. Writing skills through midterm exams and a final
4. An understanding of the historical context of critical Supreme Court decisions and skill in historical analysis
5. An understanding of the evolution of belief systems over the course of American history, as illustrated by key Supreme Court decisions

Class Format and Readings
The course format consists of weekly lectures by Justice Lopez, followed by discussion by Professor Donald Critchlow. Students will be called on at random to
discuss questions raised by lectures and readings. Questions posed by instructors during discussion are intended to press students to develop argumentative skills.

Readings for this course can be found on Canvas. There is no assigned text. The readings include excerpts of Supreme Court decisions, majority and dissenting opinions. In addition, study questions are included, as well as links to historical and legal sources placing these cases in historical perspective and offering fuller explanations of the opinions.


**Requirements and Grading**

Grades are based on two in-class midterm examinations (bring blank green/blue examination books to class); a final take-home exam to be turned in on hardcopy the day of the scheduled final; and two pop quizzes. Examination questions can be found below in the syllabus.

Students' performance in the course will be assessed according to 100 percent scale, with 98 and above an A plus (rare); 93-97 percent an A; 90-92 A-; 87-89 B plus; 83-86 B; 80-82 B minus; 77-78 C plus; 70-76 C; D in 60s.

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<th>Examination</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Midterm</td>
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<td>Second Midterm</td>
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<td>Final Exam</td>
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<td>Two Pop Quizzes (25pts x 2)</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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**Schedule and Reading Assignments**

It is necessary to complete the readings on Canvas for each court case. Lectures will explore each case, providing historical context and covering legal precedent, issues confronted by the Supreme Court, and a review of majority and dissenting opinion. Discussion following the lectures will examine opinions and ask students to defend or oppose majority and minority opinions. It is important in reading the opinions to
determine the major issue confronting the court and the larger legal and historical implications of the case; legal precedents; and reasoning for each opinion.

WEEK 1 January 8 Introductory Lecture: Critchlow, The Founding of the Constitution and Critical Concepts of Legal Reasoning within an Historical Framework
This introductory lecture presents an overview of the course and a detailed examination of the historical origins of the drafting of the Constitution in Philadelphia, the battle over ratification, and Bill of Rights. Special attention is given to the Founders’ concern over power within government; democracy; the failure to address slavery at the Philadelphia Convention; and the preservation of liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights.

WEEK 2 January 15 Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison (1803)
This pivotal court decision exerted court authority and established judicial review. The primary focus is on the rule of law as seen by the Supreme Court; the limited nature of judicial review as articulated in the decision; and the changing nature of judicial review within an historical context.

WEEK 3 January 22 State Taxing Power McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)
This court decision limited state power to tax. The establishment of the First U.S. Bank is placed within an historical context.

WEEK 4 January 29 Slavery Dred Scott v. John A. Sandford (1856)
This decision outlawed the abolition of slavery in the territories. After an examination of the decision and dissenting opinion, the class discusses the implication of this decision within the context of the Constitution and the concept of all men are created equal as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Attention is given to strict constitutional decisions and broad constitutional decisions.

WEEK 5 February 5 Racial Segregation Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
This decision upheld state power to segregate public transportation. At issue was racial bias as well as state power to regulate. State power was a critical issue in the 19th century, involving race, corporations, and labor practices.

WEEK 6 February 12 Labor Rights Lochner v. People of the State of NY (1905)
This important legal case involved regulation of labor practices and rights. The relationship between government regulation and the rights of business owners is explored in discussion.

First Midterm: In a blue/green examination booklet brought to class, select two related court cases studied up to this point in the course to write a dissent or concurring majority of the opinion(s) to reveal a common legal theme you believe important. Your essay should begin with a statement as to why you believe these decisions were wrong or right—generally or specifically—on legal/constitutonal grounds; then summaries of each case, then a full explanation of your reasoning. Your essay should frame the case within the legal
historical context confronting the court and the larger implications of the court decision.

WEEK 7 February 19 School Segregation Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (1954)
This court decision has been seen as the most important court decision in the 20th century. In discussion, the class examines the arguments for Brown; the historical background of the case; and the court’s reasoning.

WEEK 8 February 26 Criminal Rights Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
In post-World War II America, many constitutional cases involved individual civil rights. In this case, the court upheld the rights of the accused. In discussion, particular attention is given to the court’s directive on police practices.

This case was critical in determining the nature of a free press and free speech, as well as libel law.

WEEK 10 March 12 Privacy Rights: Katz v. United States (1967)
The Katz case involved the legality of wiretapping, but at issue was the larger matter of privacy. In your reading, examine majority and dissenting opinions, but keep in mind the larger issue of privacy. Did the 1st and 14th amendment presume a matter of privacy as argued by the majority decision? What were the implications of this decision for law enforcement, but more importantly for individual civil liberties?

WEEK 11 March 19 Abortion Rights Roe v. Wade (1973)
One of the most contentious decisions in the 20th century raised issues concerning individual privacy rights and women’s reproductive rights, but also issues of state power in contending interests of individuals and the community.

WEEK 12 March 26 Obscenity Law Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973)
At issue in this case were community standards and individual rights. The case involved pornography, but also a range of other issues.

This case was important for defining executive powers—the powers of the presidency and the balance of powers between the branches of government. The critical question to be asked while examining the specifics of the case is the extent to which executive privilege is necessary to the extended powers of any president, as these powers have increased in modern America?

Second Midterm: In a blue/green examination booklet brought to class, select two court cases from Brown v. Topeka Board of Education through U.S. v. Nixon to support a majority or minority opinion. In your essay, explain what ties these cases together in legal and historical terms; why you agree or disagree with the majority decision; and examine the larger historical implications of these cases for the court and the country.
The issue of free speech remains a contentious issue. This pivotal case established the right of extremists to speech and rally in the public square.

This case explores the nature of rights within an undeclared war and the rights of captured combatants. Are rights universal or limited only to citizens?

This case involves political free speech. Particular attention is given to the meaning of individual free speech and corporate, union, and Political Action Committee’s free speech. After examining the decision itself in a review of the lecture, the class will discuss the historical roots of corporations as considered individuals under the law and the implications of this.

WEEK 17 April 24 Experiences as a State Supreme Court Judge Review

FINAL Exams due in hardcopy on day of exam. Papers should be double-spaced, approximately 1000 words in length. This exam requires choosing three related cases studied over the course to explore the following questions: What has the Supreme Court gotten right (or wrong) in the course of its history? Your essay should begin with an overall thesis, then proceed to each case separately summarizing the decision, then explain why the court made the incorrect decision(s) constitutionally.

Class Behavior and Academic Integrity
Attendance at all class meetings is required; late arrival and early departure are strongly discouraged; please notify the instructors in advance, should it be necessary to miss all or part of a class meeting. Participation in classroom discussion is an important component of the course: the free expression of ideas depends on a maximum of courtesy and respect for others. Students are responsible for knowing and adhering to the ASU Student Academic Integrity Policy (see http://provost.asu.edu/academicintegrity); violations - which include, but are not limited to plagiarism, cheating on examinations, submitting work from other courses - will be sanctioned in accordance with ASU guidelines.

Students with Disabilities
We are eager to make accommodations for instruction and testing for students with disabilities; please consult with the instructors and with the ASU Disabilities Resource Services.
Title IX
Title IX is a federal law that provides that no person be excluded on the basis of sex from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity. Both Title IX and university policy make clear that sexual violence and harassment based on sex is prohibited. An individual who believes they have been subjected to sexual violence or harassed on the basis of sex can seek support, including counseling and academic support, from the university. If you or someone you know has been harassed on the basis of sex or sexually assaulted, you can find information and resources at https://sexualviolenceprevention.asu.edu/faqs.

As a mandated reporter, I am obligated to report any information I become aware of regarding alleged acts of sexual discrimination, including sexual violence and dating violence. ASU Counseling Services, https://eoss.asu.edu/counseling, is available if you wish to discuss any concerns confidentially and privately.
Discussion Questions – Plessy v. Ferguson

1. What form of segregation did the Supreme Court establish in Plessy v. Ferguson?

2. What are the implications for this ruling on racial segregation; state power; individual rights; and the concept of equality?

3. What was the impact of the Separate but Equal principle? Is there such a thing as racially separate and equal?

4. Do people have the right to choose which laws they will follow? Why or why not?

5. Should Homer Plessy be considered a criminal? Should he be considered a hero?

6. Is this case a good example of civil disobedience? What role should it play in society?
Supreme Court of the United States,
No. 210, October Term, 1895.

Homer Adolph Plessy,
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

J. N. Ferguson, Judge of Section A,
Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans.

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said Supreme Court, in this cause, be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs.

SIR, In Justice Brown.
May 18, 1896.

Dissenting:
Mr. Justice Harlan.
Transcript of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
(Transcription of the Judgement of the Supreme Court of the United States in Plessy v. Ferguson.)

Supreme Court of the United States, No.
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Dissenting:
Mr. Justice Harlan

(U.S. Supreme Court
PLESSY v. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

163 U.S. 537 PLESSY
v.
FERGUSON.

May 18, 1896.
This was a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari originally filed in the supreme court of the state by Plessy, the plaintiff in error, against the Hon. John H. Ferguson, judge of the criminal district court for the parish of Orleans, and setting forth, in substance, the following facts:

That petitioner was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the state of Louisiana, of mixed descent, in the proportion of seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and that he was entitled to every recognition, right, privilege, and immunity secured to the citizens of the United States of the white race by its constitution and laws; that on June 7, 1892, he engaged and paid for a first-class passage on the East Louisiana Railway, from New Orleans to Covington, in the same state, and
thereupon entered a passenger train, and took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were accommodated; that such railroad company was incorporated by the laws of Louisiana as a common carrier, and was not authorized to distinguish between citizens according to their race, but, notwithstanding this, petitioner was required by the conductor, under penalty of ejection from said train and imprisonment, to vacate said coach, and occupy another seat, in a coach assigned by said company for persons not of the white race, and for no other reason than that petitioner was of the colored race; that, upon petitioner's refusal to comply with such order, he was, with the aid of a police officer, forcibly ejected from said coach, and hurried off to, and imprisoned in, the parish jail of New Orleans, and there held to answer a charge made by such officer to the effect that he was guilty of having criminally violated an act of the general assembly of the state, approved July 10, 1890, in such case made and provided.

The petitioner was subsequently brought before the recorder of the city for preliminary examination, and committed for trial to the criminal district court for the parish of Orleans, where an information was filed against him in the matter above set forth, for a violation of the above act, which act the petitioner affirmed to be null and void, because in conflict with the constitution of the United States; that petitioner interposed a plea to such information, based upon the unconstitutionality of the act of the general assembly, to which the district attorney, on behalf of the state, filed a demurrer; that, upon issue being joined upon such demurrer and plea, the court sustained the demurrer, overruled the plea, and ordered petitioner to plead over to the facts set forth in the information, and that, unless the judge of the said court be enjoined by a writ of prohibition from further proceeding in such case, the court will proceed to fine and sentence petitioner to imprisonment, and thus deprive him of his constitutional rights set forth in his said plea, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the act under which he was being prosecuted; that no appeal lay from such sentence, and petitioner was without relief or remedy except by writs of prohibition and certiorari. Copies of the information and other proceedings in the criminal district court were annexed to the petition as an exhibit.

Upon the filing of this petition, an order was issued upon the respondent to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue, and be made perpetual, and a further order that the record of the proceedings had in the criminal cause be certified and transmitted to the supreme court.

To this order the respondent made answer, transmitting a certified copy of the proceedings, asserting the constitutionality of the law, and avering that, instead of pleading or admitting that he belonged to the colored race, the said Plessy declined and refused, either by pleading or otherwise, to admit that he was in any sense or in any proportion a colored man.

The case coming on for hearing before the supreme court, that court was of opinion that the law under which the prosecution was had was constitutional and denied the relief prayed for by the petitioner (Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 11 South. 948); whereupon petitioner prayed for a writ of error from this court, which was allowed by the chief justice of the supreme court of Louisiana.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting.
A. W. Tourgee and S. F. Phillips, for plaintiff in error.
Alex. Porter Morse, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of
the court.

This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly of the state of
Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored

The first section of the statute enacts 'that all railway companies carrying passengers in their
coaches in this state, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and colored
races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the
passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations: provided, that this
section shall not be construed to apply to street railroads. No person or persons shall be permitted
to occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones assigned to them, on account of the race they
belong to.'

By the second section it was enacted 'that the officers of such passenger trains shall have power
and are hereby required to assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race
to which such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting on going into a coach or compartment
to which by race he does not belong, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu
thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days in the parish prison, and any
officer of any railroad insisting on assigning a passenger to a coach or compartment other than
the one set aside for the race to which said passenger belongs, shall be liable to a fine of
twentyfive dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days
in the parish prison; and should any passenger refuse to occupy the coach or compartment to
which he or she is assigned by the officer of such railway, said officer shall have power to refuse
to carry such passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he nor the railway company
which he represents shall be liable for damages in any of the courts of this state.'

The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the officers, directors,
conductors, and employees of railway companies to comply with the act, with a proviso that
'nothing in this act shall be construed as applying to nurses attending children of the other race.'

The fourth section is immaterial.

The information filed in the criminal district court charged, in substance, that Plessy, being a
passenger between two stations within the state of Louisiana, was assigned by officers of the
company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he insisted upon going into a
coach used by the race to which he did not belong. Neither in the information nor plea was his
particular race or color averred.

The petition for the writ of prohibition averred that petitioner was seven-eights Caucasian and
one-eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him; and that
he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens of the United States of
the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where
passengers of the white race were accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate
said coach, and take a seat in another, assigned to persons of the colored race, and, having
refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected, with the aid of a police officer,
and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a charge of having violated the above act.
The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground that it conflicts both with the thirteenth amendment of the constitution, abolishing slavery, and the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part of the states.

1. That it does not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a chattel, or, at least, the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services. This amendment was said in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended primarily to abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade, when they amounted to slavery or involuntary servitude, and that the use of the word 'servitude' was intended to prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name. It was intimated, however, in that case, that this amendment was regarded by the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect the colored race from certain laws which had been enacted in the Southern states, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailing their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value; and that the fourteenth amendment was devised to meet this exigency.

So, too, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, it was said that the act of a mere individual, the owner of an inn, a public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing accommodations to colored people, cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, but only as involving an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the state, and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears. 'It would be running the slavery question into the ground,' said Mr. Justice Bradley, 'to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.'

A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do not understand that the thirteenth amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error in this connection.

2. By the fourteenth amendment, all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are made citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside; and the states are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The proper construction of this amendment was first called to the attention of this court in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, which involved, however, not a question of race, but one of exclusive privileges. The case did not call for any expression of opinion as to the exact rights it
was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally that its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the states, and to protect from the hostile legislation of the states the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of the states. The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which have been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of states where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.

One of the earliest of these cases is that of Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, in which the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts held that the general school committee of Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate schools established exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance upon the other schools. 'The great principle,' said Chief Justice Shaw, 'advanced by the learned and eloquent advocate for the plaintiff [Mr. Charles Sumner], is that, by the constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all persons, without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or condition, are equal before the law. ... But, when this great principle comes to be applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and security.' It was held that the powers of the committee extended to the establishment of separate schools for children of different ages, sexes and colors, and that they might also establish special schools for poor and neglected children, who have become too old to attend the primary school, and yet have not acquired the rudiments of learning, to enable them to enter the ordinary schools. Similar laws have been enacted by congress under its general power of legislation over the District of Columbia (sections 281- 283, 310, 319, Rev. St. D. C.), as well as by the legislatures of many of the states, and have been generally, if not uniformly, sustained by the courts. State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 210; Lehew v. Brummell (Mo. Sup.) 15 S. W. 765; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; Bertonneau v. Directors of City Schools, 3 Woods, 177, Fed. Cas. No. 1,361; People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 337; Dawson v. Lee, 83 Ky. 49.

Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within the police power of the state. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389.

The distinction between laws interfering with the political equality of the negro and those requiring the separation of the two races in schools, theaters, and railway carriages has been
frequently drawn by this court. Thus, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, it was held that a law of West Virginia limiting to white male persons 21 years of age, and citizens of the state, the right to sit upon juries, was a discrimination which implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of the right of the colored race, and was a step towards reducing them to a condition of servility. Indeed, the right of a colored man that, in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, and property, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them because of color, has been asserted in a number of cases. Virginia v. Rivers, 100 U.S. 313; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; ush v. Com., 107 U.S. 110, 1 Sup. Ct. 625; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 Sup. Ct. 904. So, where the laws of a particular locality or the charter of a particular railway corporation has provided that no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of color, we have held that this meant that persons of color should travel in the same car as white ones, and that the enactment was not satisfied by the company providing cars assigned exclusively to people of color, though they were as good as those which they assigned exclusively to white persons. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445.

Upon the other hand, where a statute of Louisiana required those engaged in the transportation of passengers among the states to give to all persons traveling within that state, upon vessels employed in that business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of the vessel, without distinction on account of race or color, and subjected to an action for damages the owner of such a vessel who excluded colored passengers on account of their color from the cabin set aside by him for the use of whites, it was held to be, so far as it applied to interstate commerce, unconstitutional and void. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485. The court in this case, however, expressly disclaimed that it had anything whatever to do with the statute as a regulation of internal commerce, or affecting anything else than commerce among the states.

In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, it was held that an act of congress entitling all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement, and made applicable to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude, was unconstitutional and void, upon the ground that the fourteenth amendment was prohibitory upon the states only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by congress for enforcing it was not direct legislation on matters respecting which the states were prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but was corrective legislation, such as might be necessary or proper for counter-acting and redressing the effect of such laws or acts. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Bradley observed that the fourteenth amendment 'does not invest congress with power to legislate upon subjects that are within the domain of state legislation, but to provide modes of relief against state legislation or state action of the kind referred to. It does not authorize congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights, but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the fourteenth amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against state laws and state proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given to congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon
such supposed state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation
and effect.'

Much nearer, and, indeed, almost directly in point, is the case of the Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry.
Co. v. State, 133 U.S. 587, 10 Sup. Ct. 348, wherein the railway company was indicted for a
violation of a statute of Mississippi, enacting that all railroads carrying passengers should
provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored races, by providing two
or more passenger cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger cars by a partition,
so as to secure separate accommodations. The case was presented in a different aspe t from the
one under consideration, inasmuch as it was an indictment against the railway company for
failing to provide the separate accommodations, but the question considered was the
constitutionality of the law. In that case, the supreme court of Mississippi (66 Miss. 662, 6 South.
203) had held that the statute applied solely to commerce within the state, and, that being the
construction of the state statute by its highest court, was accepted as conclusive. 'If it be a
matter,' said the court (page 591, 133 U. S., and page 348, 10 Sup. Ct.), 'respecting commerce
wholly within a state, and not interfering with commerce between the states, then, obviously,
there is no violation of the commerce clause of the federal constitution. ... No question arises
under this section as to the power of the state to separate in different compartments interstate
pas- sengers, or affect, in any manner, the privileges and rights of such passengers. All that we
can consider is whether the
state has the power to require that railroad trains within her limits
shall have separate accommodations for the two races. That affecting only commerce within the
state is no invasion of the power given to congress by the commerce clause.'

A like course of reasoning applies to the case under consideration, since the supreme court of
Louisiana, in the case of State v. Judge, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 South. 74, held that the statute in
question did not apply to interstate passengers, but was confined in its application to passengers
traveling exclusively within the borders of the state. The case was decided largely upon the
authority of Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. State, 66 Miss. 662, 6 South, 203, and affirmed by
this court in 133 U.S. 587, 10 Sup. Ct. 348. In the present case no question of interference with
interstate commerce can possibly arise, since the East Louisiana Railway appears to have been
purely a local line, with both its termini within the state of Louisiana. Similar statutes for the
separation of the two races upon public conveyances were held to be constitutional in Railroad v.
Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209; Day v. Owen 5 Mich. 520; Railway Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; Railroad
Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613; 4 S. W. 5; Railroad Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627, 4 S. W. 5; The
Railroad Co., 3 Inter St. Commerce Com. R. 111, 1 Inter St. Commerce Com. R. 428.

While we think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce of the
state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his
property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment, we are not prepared to say that the conductor, in
assigning passengers to the coaches according to their race, does not act at his peril, or that the
provision of the second section of the act that denies to the passenger compensa- tion in damages
for a refusal to receive him into the coach in which he properly belongs is a valid exercise of the
legislative power. Indeed, we understand it to be conceded by the state's attorney that such part
of the act as exempts from liability the railway company and its officers is unconstitutional. The power to assign to a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine to which race the passenger belongs, as well as the power to determine who, under the laws of the particular state, is to be deemed a white, and who a colored, person. This question, though indicated in the brief of the plaintiff in error, does not properly arise upon the record in this case, since the only issue made is as to the unconstitutionality of the act, so far as it requires the railway to provide separate accommodations, and the conductor to assign passengers according to their race.

It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in a mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is 'property,' in the same sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property. Conceding this to be so, for the purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any way affects his right to, such property. If he be a white man, and assigned to a colored coach, he may have his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his so-called 'property.' Upon the other hand, if he be a colored man, and be so assigned, he has been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.

In this connection, it is also suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error that the same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring railways to provide separate accommodations for the two races will also authorize them to require separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one side of the street, and white people upon the other, or requiring white men's houses to be painted white, and colored men's black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color. The reply to all this is that every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, it was held by this court that a municipal ordinance of the city of San Francisco, to regulate the carrying on of public laundries within the limits of the municipality, violated the provisions of the constitution of the United States, if it conferred upon the municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will, and without regard to discretion, in the legal sense of the term, to give or withhold consent as to persons or places, without regard to the competency of the persons applying or the propriety of the places selected for the carrying on of the business. It was held to be a covert attempt on the part of the municipality to make an arbitrary and unjust discrimination against the Chinese race. While this was the case of a municipal ordinance, a like principle has been held to apply to acts of a state legislature passed in the exercise of the police power. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 16 Sup. Ct. 714, and cases cited on page 700, 161 U. S., and page 714, 16 Sup. Ct.; Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 3 N.E. 538; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665; Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Pa. St. 396; Osman v. Riley, 15 Cal. 48.

So far, then, as a conflict with the fourteenth amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the
question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment than the acts of congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.

We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption. The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. As was said by the court of appeals of New York in People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448: 'This end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they are designed to operate. When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law, and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was organized, and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with which it is endowed.' Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.

It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which there is a difference of opinion in the different states; some holding that any visible admixture of black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race (State v. Chavers, 5 Jones [N. C.] 1); others, that it depends upon the preponderance of blood (Gray v. State, 4 Ohio, 354; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665); and still others, that the predominance of white blood must only be in the proportion of three-fourths (People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406; Jones v. Com., 80 Va. 544). But these are questions to be determined under the laws of each state, and are not properly put in issue in this case. Under the allegations of his petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether, under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race.

The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.
Mr. Justice BREWER did not hear the argument or participate in the decision of this case.

Mr. Justice HARLAN dissenting.

By the Louisiana statute the validity of which is here involved, all railway companies (other than street-railroad companies) carry passengers in that state are required to have separate but equal accommodations for white and colored persons, 'by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations.' Under this statute, no colored person is permitted to occupy a seat in a coach assigned to white persons; nor any white person to occupy a seat in a coach assigned to colored persons. The managers of the railroad are not allowed to exercise any discretion in the premises, but are required to assign each passenger to some coach or compartment set apart for the exclusive use of his race. If a passenger insists upon going into a coach or compartment not set apart for persons of his race, he is subject to be fined, or to be imprisoned in the parish jail. Penalties are prescribed for the refusal or neglect of the officers, directors, conductors, and employees of railroad companies to comply with the provisions of the act.

Only 'nurses attending children of the other race' are excepted from the operation of the statute. No exception is made of colored attendants traveling with adults. A white man is not permitted to have his colored servant with him in the same coach, even if his condition of health requires the constant personal assistance of such servant. If a colored maid insists upon riding in the same coach with a white woman whom she has been employed to serve, and who may need her personal attention while traveling, she is subject to be fined or imprisoned for such an exhibition of zeal in the discharge of duty.

While there may be in Louisiana persons of different races who are not citizens of the United States, the words in the act 'white and colored races' necessarily include all citizens of the United States of both races residing in that state. So that we have before us a state enactment that compels, under penalties, the separation of the two races in railroad passenger coaches, and makes it a crime for a citizen of either race to enter a coach that has been assigned to citizens of the other race.

Thus, the state regulates the use of a public highway by citizens of the United States solely upon the basis of race.

However apparent the injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider whether it is consistent with the constitution of the United States.

That a railroad is a public highway, and that the corporation which owns or operates it is in the exercise of public functions, is not, at this day, to be disputed. Mr. Justice Nelson, speaking for this court in New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 382, said that a common carrier was in the exercise 'of a sort of public office, and has public duties to perform, from which he should not be permitted to exonerate himself without the assent of the parties concerned.' Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the judgment of this court in Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 694, said: 'That railroads, though constructed by private corporations, and owned by them, are public highways, has been the doctrine of nearly all the courts ever since such conveniences for passage and transportation have had any existence. Very early the question
aro供应 whether a state's right of eminent domain could be exercised by a private corporation created for the purpose of constructing a railroad. Clearly, it could not, unless taking land for such a purpose by such an agency is taking land for public use. The right of eminent domain nowhere justifies taking property for a private use. Yet it is a doctrine universally accepted that a state legislature may authorize a private corporation to take land for the construction of such a road, making compensation to the owner. What else does this doctrine mean if not that building a railroad, though it be built by a private corporation, is an act done for a public use? So, in Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 676: 'Though the corporation [a railroad company] was private, its work was public, as much so as if it were to be constructed by the state.' So, in Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western R. Corp., 4 Metc. (Mass.) 564: 'The establishment of that great thoroughfare is regarded as a public work, established by public authority, intended for the public use and benefit, the use of which is secured to the whole community, and constitutes, therefore, like a canal, turnpike, or highway, a public easement.' It is true that the real and personal property, necessary to the establishment and management of the railroad, is vested in the corporation; but it is in trust for the public.'

In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights. Every true man has pride of race, and under appropriate circumstances, when the rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems proper. But I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved. Indeed, such legislation as that here in question is inconsistent not only with that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, national and state, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the United States.

The thirteenth amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation of any right necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom in this country. This court has so adjudged. But, that amendment having been found inadequate to the protection of the rights of those who had been in slavery, it was followed by the fourteenth amendment, which added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship, and to the security of personal liberty, by declaring that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside,' and that 'no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These two amendments, if enforced according to their true intent and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship. Finally, and to the end that no citizen should be denied, on account of his race, the privilege of participating in the political control of his country, it was declared by the fifteenth amendment that 'the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.'
These notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the friends of liberty throughout the world. They removed the race line from our governmental systems. They had, as this court has said, a common purpose, namely, to secure 'to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations have been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.' They declared, in legal effect, this court has further said, 'that the law in the states shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the states; and in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color.' We also said: 'The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity or right, most valuable to the colored race, the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored; exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy; and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.' It was, consequently, adjudged that a state law that excluded citizens of the colored race from juries, because of their race, however well qualified in other respects to discharge the duties of jurors, was repugnant to the fourteenth amendment. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306, 307 S.; Virginia v. Rives, Id. 313; Ex parte Virginia, Id. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386; Bush v. Com., 107 U.S. 110, 116, 1 S. Sup. Ct. 625. At the present term, referring to the previous adjudications, this court declared that 'underlying all of those decisions is the principle that the constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the general government or the states against any citizen because of his race. All citizens are equal before the law.' Gibson v. State, 162 U.S. 565, 16 Sup. Ct. 904.

The decisions referred to show the scope of the recent amendments of the constitution. They also show that it is not within the power of a state to prohibit colored citizens, because of their race, from participating as jurors in the administration of justice.

It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination among whites in the matter of commodation for travelers. The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary. The fundamental objection, therefore, to the statute, is that it interferes with the personal freedom of citizens. 'Personal liberty,' it has been well said, 'consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever places one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.' 1 Bl. Comm. *134. If a white man and a black man choose to occupy the same public conveyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so; and no government, proceeding alone on grounds of race, can prevent it without infringing the personal liberty of each.
It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to carry. It is quite another thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from traveling in the same public conveyance, and to punish officers of railroad companies for permitting persons of the two races to occupy the same passenger coach. If a state can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one side of a street, and black citizens to keep on the other? Why may it not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in street cars or in open vehicles on a public road or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign whites to one side of a court room, and blacks to the other? And why may it not also prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative halls or in public assemblages convened for the consideration of the political questions of the day? Further, if this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the state require the separation in railroad coaches of native and naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?

The answer given at the argument to these questions was that regulations of the kind they suggest would be unreasonable, and could not, therefore, stand before the law. Is it meant that the determination of questions of legislative power depends upon the inquiry whether the statute whose validity is questioned is, in the judgment of the courts, a reasonable one, taking all the circumstances into consideration? A statute may be unreasonable merely because a sound public policy forbade its enactment. But I do not understand that the courts have anything to do with the policy or expediency of legislation. A statute may be valid, and yet, upon grounds of public policy, may well be characterized as unreasonable. Mr. Sedgwick correctly states the rule when he says that, the legislative intention being clearly ascertained, 'the courts have no other duty to perform than to execute the legislative will, without any regard to their views as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactment.' Sedg. St. & Const. Law, 324. There is a dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge the functions of the courts, by means of judicial interference with the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. Our institutions have the distinguishing characteristic that the three departments of government are co-ordinate and separate. Each much keep within the limits defined by the constitution. And the courts best discharge their duty by executing the will of the law-making power, constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by the people through their representatives. Statutes must always have a reasonable construction. Sometimes they are to be construed strictly, sometimes literally, in order to carry out the legislative will. But, however construed, the intent of the legislature is to be respected if the particular statute in question is valid, although the courts, looking at the public interests, may conceive the statute to be both unreasonable and impolitic. If the power exists to enact a statute, that ends the matter so far as the courts are concerned. The adjudged cases in which statutes have been held to be void, because unreasonable, are those in which the means employed by the legislature were not at all germane to the end to which the legislature was competent.

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarantied by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.

In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.

It was adjudged in that case that the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, were not included nor intended to be included under the word 'citizens' in the constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to citizens of the United States; that, at time of the adoption of the constitution, they were 'considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them.' 17 How. 393, 404. The recent amendments of the constitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of the states, a dominant race,—a superior class of citizens,—which assumes to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race. The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted the recent amendments of the constitution, by one of which the blacks of this country were made citizens of the United States and of the states in which they respectively reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the states are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks. The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.

The sure guaranty of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our governments, national and state, of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United States, without regard to race. State enactments regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the war, under the pretense of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the continuance of which must do harm to all concerned. This question is not met by the suggestion that social equality cannot exist between the white and black races in this
country. That argument, if it can be properly regarded as one, is scarcely worthy of consideration; for social equality no more exists between two races when traveling in a passenger coach or a public highway than when members of the same races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or stand or sit with each other in a political assembly, or when they use in common the streets of a city or town, or when they are in the same room for the purpose of having their names placed on the registry of voters, or when they approach the ballot box in order to exercise the high privilege of voting.

There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But, by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate in the political control of the state and nation, who are not excluded, by law or by reason of their race, from public stations of any kind, and who have all the legal rights that belong to white citizens, are yet declared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by citizens of the white race. It is scarcely just to say that a colored citizen should not object to occupying a public coach assigned to his own race. He does not object, nor, perhaps, would he object to separate coaches for his race if his rights under the law were recognized. But he does object, and he ought never to cease objecting, that citizens of the white and black races can be adjudged criminals because they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the same public coach on a public highway. The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.

If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will surely come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race. We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.

The result of the whole matter is that while this court has frequently adjudged, and at the present term has recognized the doctrine, that a state cannot, consistently with the constitution of the United States, prevent white and black citizens, having the required qualifications for jury service, from sitting in the same jury box, it is now solemnly held that a state may prohibit white and black citizens from sitting in the same passenger coach on a public highway, or may require that they be separated by a 'partition' when in the same passenger coach. May it not now be reasonably expected that astute men of the dominant race, who affect to be disturbed at the possibility that the integrity of the white race may be corrupted, or that its supremacy will be imperiled, by contact on public highways with black people, will endeavor to procure statutes requiring white and black jurors to be separated in the jury box by a 'partition,' and that, upon retiring from the court room to consult as to their verdict, such partition, if it be a movable one,
shall be taken to their consultation room, and set up in such way as to prevent black jurors from coming too close to their brother jurors of the white race. If the 'partition' used in the court room happens to be stationary, provision could be made for screens with openings through which jurors of the two races could confer as to their verdict without coming into personal contact with each other. I cannot see but that, according to the principles this day announced, such state legislation, although conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose of humiliating, citizens of the United States of a particular race, would be held to be consistent with the constitution.

I do not deem it necessary to review the decisions of state courts to which reference was made in argument. Some, and the most important, of them, are wholly inapplicable, because rendered prior to the adoption of the last amendments of the constitution, when colored people had very few rights which the dominant race felt obliged to respect. Others were made at a time when public opinion, in many localities, was dominated by the institution of slavery; when it would not have been safe to do justice to the black man; and when, so far as the rights of blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practically, the supreme law of the land. Those decisions cannot be guides in the era introduced by the recent amendments of the supreme law, which established universal civil freedom, gave citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United States, and residing ere, obliterated the race line from our systems of governments, national and state, and placed our free institutions upon the broad and sure foundation of the equality of all men before the law.

I am of opinion that the state of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that state, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the constitution of the United States. If laws of like character should be enacted in the several states of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law, would, it is true, have disappeared from our country; but there would remain a power in the states, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom, to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race, and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now constituting a part of the political community, called the 'People of the United States,' for whom, and by whom through representatives, our government is administered. Such a system is inconsistent with the guaranty given by the constitution to each state of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down by congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

For the reason stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent from the opinion and judgment of the majority.

**Key Concept:** Separate But Equal
Separate but equal doctrine refers to a now-defunct principle that allowed African Americans to be segregated if they were provided with equal opportunities and facilities in education, public transportation, and jobs. The rule was expounded in the case Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (U.S. 1896) where the court held that if one race is inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane. The object of the Fourteenth Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.